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The purchasing power of the government purchase card is not keeping pace with inflation 
and its present terms of use are neither efficient nor effective. A purchase card transaction 
limit increase would maximize resources, allow the Fleet Logistics Center to focus on 
more complex contracts, and increase mission readiness at operational units. 
When it was established in 1989, the government purchase card program’s 
transaction limit was $2,000. In 1994, legislation established the $2,500 micropurchase 
limit for supplies and services because the General Service Administration determined 
that 85% of contracts written were below $2,500. The $2,000 limit for construction 
continues as set by the Davis-Bacon Act of 1931, which was written before establishment 
of the minimum wage and has never increased for inflation. That $2,000 limit from 1931 
currently has a buying power of $128 and, to meet the intent of the law, should be applied 
only to construction projects over $31,194. 
The purpose of this project is to explore the decision to increase the purchase card 
transaction limit. This project examines the regulations, risks, and concerns regarding an 
increase in the transaction limit. This research recommends that the government purchase 
card transaction limit be increased to between $8,000 and $13,000. 
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The government purchase card (GPC) transaction limit needs to be increased to 
between $8,000 and $13,000 in order to keep up with inflation and to allow contracting 
resources to focus their attention on larger, more complex contracts. Adjusted for 
inflation, the $2,500 micropurchase limit set by the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
(FASA) of 1994 would only have the purchasing power of $1,562.82 today, according to 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) (CoinNews, 2014). Simply to maintain the intended 
purchasing power, the micropurchase limit should be increased to $4,000 (CoinNews, 
2014); however, greater efficiencies would be realized if the limit was set between 
$8,000 and $13,000.  
The purpose of this project is to explore the possibility of increasing the purchase 
card transaction limit and determine if it is feasible to make the changes. This project will 
examine the regulations, risks, and concerns regarding an increase in the transaction limit 
of the purchase card. 
This research is important because fiscal constraints continue to reduce the 
funding to the Department of Defense (DOD) and the spotlight is back on acquisition 
reform as inefficiencies after a decade of war become an easy target of government 
wastefulness. An increase in the purchase card limit would result in greater mission 
readiness in addition to cost savings in the acquisition process. The more autonomy 
allowed to the operational units, the more efficient the acquisition process can become. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The purchase card “was established to streamline federal agency acquisition 
processes by providing a low cost, efficient vehicle for obtaining goods and services 
directly from vendors” (GAO, 2003b, p. 4). “Specifically, the purchase card enables 
agencies to expedite purchases, streamline payment procedures, and reduce 
administrative costs” (OIG, 2003, p. 1) by “[lowering] transaction purchasing costs and 
[reducing] red tape for both the government and the vendor community” (GAO, 2002, 
p. 1) to simplify the process for small-dollar transactions, which use up a disproportionate 
 2
amount of resources for their small dollar value. By not allowing the purchase card limit 
to increase with inflation, or some other index, the government is not using its resources 
efficiently or effectively.  
The primary research question: Is it feasible to update or create regulations to 
increase the purchase card limit higher than the current $3,000? 
1. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), “the 
convenience of the purchase card must be balanced against the time and cost involved 
with training, monitoring and oversight of cardholders” and “limiting credit available is a 
key factor in minimizing government financial exposure” (GAO, 2002, pp. 11, 15). At 
what transaction level does the risk of misuse outweigh the cost of added oversight?  
2. What are the current protocols for the purchase card and what is the basis 
for those protocols? 
3. How is the purchase card used and managed in industry? Are government 
purchase card programs in line with what industry is doing?  
4. What specific findings and recommendations can be made for increasing 
the threshold, if warranted?  
B. METHODOLOGY 
To obtain more information, this study began with a thorough review of related 
reports and articles that have been written about the GPC and gathered data from various 
knowledgeable government sources. A thorough literature review of GAO and Office of 
the Inspector General (OIG) reports related to purchase cards, along with other various 
reports, articles and studies related to purchase cards, contracting, and acquisition was 
conducted. The specific documents are discussed and referenced in Chapter II. Despite all 
this available information, it was determined that current, real-time data was needed to 
determine how encompassing this issue really is, and to analyze the efficacy of the 
programs in place.  
In order to get an accurate picture of current contract and purchase card 
purchasing practices, this study determined that data needed to be collected from 
(1) contracting sources to find out how many contracts are written; (2) the purchase card 
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program to find out how many purchases are made on the purchase card; and (3) the 
Procurement Performance Management Assessment Program (PPMAP) office to 
determine what kinds of purchase card programs are possible and how common they are. 
These sources provided ample data to analyze, but left more questions.  
This study needed to look more specifically at how operational units use these 
purchasing vehicles, how the Fleet Logistics Center (FLC) process works, and how 
purchase card programs work in industry. Supplementary information was requested 
from (1) operational units to determine how large the purchase card programs were and 
how frequently an operational unit required a contract, (2) contracting sources to 
determine what the process of a contract is and how much manpower each piece of the 
process takes, and (3) PPMAP and Afloat Training Group (ATG) to determine how the 
purchase card program is audited and how much misuse the government program 
currently experiences. Once this secondary research was complete, curiosity was aroused 
about (1) how for-profit companies use and manage their purchase card programs, how 
they determine risk, and what internal controls they employ and (2) how banks determine 
risk and how they set up their commercial purchase card programs. These findings were 
compiled, analyzed, and presented to several high-level parties in the contracting and 
purchase card arena. They were then asked for their reactions and concerns about the 
purchase card program. The responses from these high-level program participants 
became a critical part of this research.  
1. Initial Research 
In order to get a basic understanding of the topic, a search for reports and articles 
related to purchase cards, contracting, and federal procurement was conducted. This 
initial research helped to build a big-picture view about the challenges, concerns, and 
changes that have affected the purchase card in the past. These historical accounts were 
very valuable resources, as they spelled out concerns that need to be addressed for future 
controls and procedures. This initial research consisted mostly of GAO and OIG reports 
(see Chapter II Literature Review), as they provided specific background information for 
the topic; however, several journal articles were included to outline the history of 
contracting and the purchase card. 
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2. Research Data 
In order for this research project to answer the questions about the effectiveness 
of the current purchase card and contracting programs, there was a great deal of data to 
gather from the contracting and purchase card users, as well as those who provide 
oversight. There was some readily available data, but much of the data needed to be 
collected from subject matter experts (SME) in the process on an individual basis. All the 
data collected has been considered normal business data and contains no personally 
identifiable information (PII), nor proprietary information. The purpose of this data 
analysis was to see how the purchase card program compares to the contract program and 
to determine if there is a point at which they can complement each other, working 
together to make the operational units more successful.  
a.  Design of the Research 
The research was designed to get a broad look at users of the purchase card and its 
stakeholders. For example, there are those who use the purchase card, those who oversee 
the purchase card use, and those who audit the purchase card. Each of the stakeholders 
can provide data about how extensively a purchase card or contract is used at a particular 
unit vs. Navy-wide. Those who oversee these programs have a big picture understanding 
of the impact of various regulations and laws.  
b.  Data Collection 
In order to get a proper view of all the stakeholders in the purchase card program, 
data was collected from operational users, a contracting office, purchase card auditors, 
industry purchase card managers, a bank executive whose position supports commercial 
card programs, managers who oversee the purchase card program, and those who own the 
purchase card program.  
The most important data for this study was readily available from FLC and the 
Consolidated Card Program Management Division (CCPMD). This data provided key 
information on how broad the purchase card and contract programs are in the Navy.  
(1) FLC provided four years of data on all contracts completed at the FLCs 
between fiscal years (FY) 10–13. The data was analyzed to determine if there were 
obvious breaks in the data that would support a new purchase card limit recommendation. 
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(2) The CCPMD is the program and policy arm of all card programs in the 
Navy. The purchase card division provided data about the number of current cardholders 
and the breakdown of Navy purchase card purchases for the last four years. This 
important information could be compared to the contract data. At various cost levels, it 
needed to be determined how the workload is spread between the purchase card and 
contract programs.  
(3) Information was requested from PPMAP about variations of authority that 
are possible with a purchase card and what percentage of users there are at each level of 
authority.  
After getting the data from the contract and purchase card offices, it was 
determined that there was more information needed and the project should expand to 
include specific information from more stakeholders. Data from operational units was 
needed that presented contract and purchase card spending; and data from the FLC about 
how the contract process works needed to be collected. It was important to find out what 
the individual steps of the contracting process are and map out the timeframes involved. 
The auditors of the purchase card program could also provide valuable information about 
purchase card misuse and the auditing process. Although this author has an operational 
background, it was necessary to get a broader range of experiences from other Supply 
Officers currently in the fleet.  
(4) To get the operational perspective, shipboard Supply Officers were 
contacted because they have a standard contact format, whereas shore duty Supply 
Officers can only be contacted by name. These shipboard Supply Officers were asked to 
provide data about how many Approving Officials (AO) and how many cardholders are 
in their program, the average monthly purchase card purchases, and how many and the 
dollar amount of contracts that were sent to FLC between FY10–13. This information 
was required to determine how large a typical ship purchase card program is and how 
frequently contracts were utilized at the operational level. 
(5) A guided walk-through tour of the contracting process at FLC was 
conducted to better understand the process and the manpower involved in getting a 
contract in place. The process walk-through began as soon as the requesting unit entered 
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the contract request in the Funding Document Manager (FDM) system and ended when 
the contract was signed and released to the requestor and vendor. This data was collected 
to determine what occurs at each step in the process, how long each step takes, and how 
many steps are involved.  
(6) Data was collected from the PPMAP personnel to learn about misuse in 
the Navy purchase card program and to obtain the history of auditing in the Navy card 
program.  
(7) Data was collected from the ATG, the auditors of the shipboard purchase 
card programs, in order to understand the limitations, issues, and operational effects of 
the purchase card.  
After collecting the data from the FLC, operational Supply Officers, and the 
purchase card program auditors, it was determined that there was still more information 
needed to ensure a thorough examination of the issues and processes at hand. It was 
unclear how for-profit businesses used their purchase cards and how a bank determined if 
they would support a purchase card program. It was important to understand how the 
nuances of a purchase card that uses taxpayer dollars might compare with industry which 
focuses on profits and how the banks would look at the differences.  
(8) Financial managers in industry were contacted to get detailed information 
about their credit card programs. Data was collected from four companies that are similar 
to the government in that they do not manufacture or sell a physical product, are capital 
intensive, manpower heavy, and are primarily in the business of movement and/or 
service. Representatives from an airline, a trucking company, a community college, and 
an engineering company were interviewed. Data was collected about what controls are 
utilized and how many cardholders are in their programs, how much flexibility is given to 
cardholders, how much paperwork is required, and how the reconciliation process works. 
This project allowed a comparison between how industry uses the purchase card against 
the government’s methods of running the purchase card program.  
(9) Information was collected from one of the banks that administers federal 
government commercial purchase card programs to determine what, if any, internal 
controls they require when a new commercial purchase card program is established. They 
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were asked what safeguards are in place to protect themselves and how they mitigate the 
risk of a new or existing program. This data was collected to determine if the current 
controls in place are the result of the bank requirements or if they are government-
established. 
(10) Upon completion of the preceding nine data collection areas, this research 
and analysis provided a stronger case to present to administrators who could change 
policy. Leaders and policy-makers in the credit card and contracting fields were 
contacted to discuss the various findings in order to understand and answer high-level 
concerns regarding the research. Personnel contacted were a type commander (TYCOM) 
Comptroller, ATG (auditors of afloat purchase card programs), FLC contract manager 
(who oversees those who produce contracts for the fleet), two CCPMD Managers 
(oversees training and policies for the Navy), a Naval Supply Systems Command 
(NAVSUP) contracting representative, a Small Business Administration advocate, and 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD 
(AT&L)) Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP), the office who owns the 
DOD purchase card program policy. 
C. SCOPE 
Although the GPC is a government-wide procurement device, the scope of this 
project was limited to the Navy, both for ease of information/data access and familiarity 
with the process. In some cases, the scope is limited further to operational Naval support, 
due to the consistent communication possibilities for the shipboard Supply Officer which 
is not available to other types of commands and because the operational units are the ones 
who often have the greatest time constraints and limitations.  
The purchase information contained in this research project does not consider the 
significant number or amount of purchases procured through the stock system.  
For the industry comparison companies, companies that had little or no 
international presence were selected for interview. As companies become very large or 
international, their corporate financial offices became too difficult to reach using contact 
information available to a consumer. Additionally, several large, international companies 
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were contacted who understood what was requested, but they were unwilling to share 
even basic information. A personal contact was obtained for an engineering company, 
which was by far the largest company interviewed.  
D. IRB PROTOCOL 
Institutional review board (IRB) protocol was established to ensure that any 
research conducted for a study does not produce adverse effects (cause harm) to the study 
subjects. Following IRB protocol, Supply Officers, industry procurement officials, 
bankers, and FLC personnel were contacted to collect data related to this study. Since 
normal business data that did not contain personal data was being collected, special 
permission from the participants and signed consent waivers were not required. Care was 
taken to not collect any PII and to code or prepare the data and notes so they could not be 
associated to a particular person. There were also some entities that specifically requested 
to be referred to in generic terms within the project.  
Following a stricter IRB protocol, when the findings and recommendations were 
discussed in interview with the leadership and policy-makers within the credit card and 
contracting arena, a consent waiver was obtained that specifically requested permission to 
quote interview responses in this report. These subjects were asked for their reactions and 
concerns, which are considered opinions; because they may be more easily identifiable as 
individuals due to the positions they hold, the subjects’ interview notes were typed up 
and presented to them for verification before publication to avoid misrepresentation. 
E. WHAT TO EXPECT 
The GPC has been around for nearly 30 years and the program has not been 
keeping up with inflation, thereby losing purchasing power each year. This project 
intends to prove that the controls in place are effective and the technologies available are 
making oversight more manageable than ever.  
In Chapter II, the reader will be provided with a brief history of the purchase card 
program, a literature review of current and past reports and articles that pertain to the 
topic of acquisition and the purchase card, and a summary of the provided data in order to 
show that a problem exists. 
 9
In Chapter III, there will be a presentation of the data collected and the interviews 
conducted to further enlighten the subject. This will show that there are a significant 
number of stakeholders in the process. 
In Chapter IV, the data will be combined, analyzed, and interpreted to explore the 
issue further.  
Chapter V will summarize the entire project and make recommendations for 
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II. BACKGROUND 
In Chapter I, this project introduced the idea of increasing the purchase card 
transaction limit and posed the question of risk, protocols, and comparison to industry. 
However, before we can discuss the future of the purchase card program, we should 
review the past. This chapter will discuss a brief history of the purchase card and 
legislative changes, summarize relevant historical and current literature about the 
purchase card and program management and present the main data collected and used to 
summarize the issue of increasing the purchase card transaction limit. 
The government purchase card (GPC) program has been in place for more than 
twenty-five years. Introduced to government agencies in the late 1980s, the intent was to 
minimize paperwork and administrative costs for smaller purchases (GAO, 2002).  
During the first five years, purchase card use was slowly growing, until a National 
Performance Review in 1993 recommended that government agencies move as much 
business as possible to the purchase card (Gupta & Palmer, 2008). The Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 officially established the threshold for 
micropurchases at $2,500 for supplies and services and eliminated most of the restrictions 
on procurement actions at that level (OIG, 2003); construction projects remained at 
$2,000, due to the restrictions within the Davis-Bacon Act of 1931 (OIG, 2007).1  
 By the early 2000s, according to various Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) reports, purchase card use had ballooned. Many agencies had issued nearly one-
third of their personnel a purchase card. Not surprisingly, internal controls and oversight 
were not effective to manage such a large number of cardholders. Training at all levels 
was lacking. Cases of abuse and misuse touched nearly every government agency. A 
series of major GAO investigations recommended overhauling internal controls, 
especially by immediately reducing the number of cardholders and enforcing the span of 
                                                 
1 The $2,000 limit was based on the Davis-Bacon Act. Written in 1931, the Davis Bacon Act required 
the determination of local, prevailing wages for payment on any federal public works construction projects 
(Labor, 2009) exceeding $2,000 to prevent construction companies from taking advantage of workers who 
were willing to work for anything during the depression (GAO, 2011). Had this Act been adjusted for 
inflation, we would only require a wage determination at $31,100 (CoinNews, 2014).  
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control limitations. Since most of the controls they mentioned were already in place in 
the program, what they were actually recommending was more effective oversight. The 
specific GAO reports will be discussed in Section C: Literature Review. Between 2000 
and 2002, the Procurement Performance Management Assessment Program (PPMAP) 
was building up their personnel to provide the needed auditing oversight. Better 
instructions were promulgated that put attention on issues that were lacking and formally 
explained how the card programs should be audited (Interview with PPMAP, 2014). 
The Navy GPC program has improved tremendously since the GAO reports 
began surfacing more than 10 years ago. A focus on training and access to information 
has increased, knowledge and oversight has improved, and supporting computer systems 
have enabled real-time access to information.  
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Executive Order 12,352 issued in 1982 required procurement reform and 
suggested purchase cards as a method of reducing administrative costs of buying supplies 
and services (Gupta & Palmer, 2008). In 1986, the Department of Commerce 
implemented a pilot program for the purchase card. Despite the steep learning curve, the 
program was a success and deemed ready for government-wide use. In 1989, General 
Service Administration (GSA) implemented the International Merchant Purchase 
Authorization Card (IMPAC) program (Gupta & Palmer, 2008), the first government-
wide purchase card program. The original purchase limits for the GPC were set at $2,000 
(Interview with SBA, 2014). 
In 1994, FASA established the micropurchase limit at $2,500 and excused most 
purchases below this limit from many of the contracting restrictions, like competition. 
Purchasing authority using the purchase card was also given to those without contracting 
authority (Gupta & Palmer, 2008). Executive Order 12,931 encouraged maximum use of 
the FASA guidance because purchases under $2,500 made up more than 90% of federal 
purchase transactions, are available on the open market, usually available immediately, 
and do not require extensive acquisition knowledge to procure (Gupta & Palmer, 2008). 
These would eventually be called “commercial, off-the-shelf” (COTS) items. 
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In FY07, the threshold increased to the current amount of $3,000 for supplies, but 
services remained at $2,500 in accordance with the Service Contract Act, and 
construction remained at $2,000 (SHC, 2012). 
B. TIMELINE 
The GCPC is the result of a number of government actions. The timeline of 
events and the basic impact is summarized in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Government Actions Affecting the GPC Program (after Gupta, 2008) 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There has been a significant amount of information published about the GPC 
program over the last 20 years (GAO, 2003a; AGA, 2006; Gupta & Palmer, 2008). Much 
of the literature is in the form of internal process investigations, or GAO and Office of 
the Inspector General (OIG) reports, on misuse of the purchase card (GAO, 2001, 2008; 
OIG, 2012). Although many of these reports were written more than 10 years ago, and 
most of the concerns have been addressed (GAO, 2003b; OIG, 2013), they are still 
relevant and important to acknowledge. They are still a model for developing current and 
future standards. Recommendations given in the past were included as important pieces 
of the thought process for future dealings with the purchase card. 
1.  Government Accountability Office Reports 
According to the website, the GAO was established in 1921 as an independent, 
nonpartisan agency that works for Congress. Often called the “congressional watchdog,” 
they investigate how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars (GAO, 2014c). 
There have been numerous GAO reports relating to the purchase card and they 
began in 2002. 
GAO-01-995T PURCHASE CARDS: Control Weaknesses Leave Two Navy Units 
Vulnerable to Fraud and Abuse  
This testimony looked at two commands in San Diego and determined that they 
had ineffective controls for selecting who should be issued a purchase card and what their 
limits should be. The lack of internal controls established an environment where 
cardholders were making purchases for their own benefit, purchasing items well beyond 
government need or relevant cost, and initiating multiple purchases to the same vendor in 
one day to get around purchase limits (split purchases). 
Relevant Information from the Report 
The specific factors that contributed to the lack of positive control 
environment at these two units included a proliferation of purchase 
cardholders, ineffective training of cardholders and certifying officers, 
ineffective rebate management, and a lack of monitoring and oversight. 
(GAO, 2001, p. 6) 
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Management plays a key role in demonstrating and maintaining an 
organization’s integrity and ethical values, especially in setting and 
maintaining the organization’s ethical tone, providing guidance for proper 
behavior, removing temptations for unethical behavior, and providing 
discipline when appropriate. (GAO, 2001, pp. 5–6) 
GAO-02-1041 PURCHASE CARDS: Navy Is Vulnerable to Fraud and Abuse but Is 
Taking Action to Resolve Control Weaknesses  
In the early years of the purchase card program, the Department of Defense 
(DOD) was heavily promoting the use of purchase cards as a way to eliminate the 
paperwork burden of small purchases. However, due to inadequate internal controls, 
fraud, waste, and misuse became an overwhelming problem. This study looked at the 
effectiveness of the Navy’s purchase card control environment and management, whether 
the internal controls were effective in providing reasonable assurance about the proper 
use of the purchase card, and if there were indications of potential fraud, waste, and 
abuse. 
This GAO report found that there were too many card holders, credit limits were 
higher than necessary (this report identified more than 60 cardholders with a $9.9M 
monthly credit limit), span of control was insufficient for proper oversight, and refresher 
training would be helpful.  
Relevant Information from the Report 
The convenience of the purchase card must be balanced against the time 
and cost involved in the training, monitoring and oversight of cardholders. 
(GAO, 2002, p. 11) 
Limiting credit available to cardholders is a key factor in managing the 
purchase card program and in minimizing the government’s financial 
exposure. (GAO, 2002, p. 15) 
GAO-04-87G AUDIT GUIDE: Auditing and Investigating the Internal Control of 
Government Purchase Card Programs  
This GAO report was written to provide guidance to managers for performing 
audits and investigations of their purchase card program. They suggest it may be useful to 
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have someone who is not directly involved in the purchase card program give it a more 
in-depth look to see how the program should be running. 
Relevant Information from the Report 
With the increase in purchase card use came increases in risk; revelations 
of significant weaknesses in internal control; and resulting in fraudulent, 
improper, and abusive purchases. (GAO, 2003a, p. 5) 
GAO-04-156 PURCHASE CARDS: Steps Taken to Improve DoD Program 
Management, but actions Needed to Address Misuse  
This GAO report acknowledges that DOD has taken great steps to improve 
processes and remove opportunities to misuse the purchase card program. While the 
procedures and policies have been updated with previous GAO recommendations to 
improve the processes taken by cardholders, there is still room in the oversight area to 
take more proactive action. 
Relevant Information from the Report 
DOD has made the most progress in establishing or modifying procedures 
and has comparatively more to do in the managerial or oversight-related 
areas. (GAO, 2003b, p. 2) 
GAO-04-430 CONTRACT MANAGEMENT: Agencies Can Achieve Significant 
Savings on Purchase Card Buys  
One of the major drawbacks of the purchase card program is the inability to 
capitalize on consolidated efforts. When a contract is in place, it can include discounts 
based on the size of the contract and every agency falling under that contract would 
receive benefits of the discount. However, with the purchase card program, there is less 
obvious bulk buying and there is little incentive for a company to reward individual 
purchases. Additionally, a cardholder may not realize that a particular vendor offers a 
discount. 
Many agencies have taken initiatives to locate vendors and negotiate discounts, 
but the success rate varies drastically from one agency to another. For example, the 
Veterans’ Administration has discount agreements with nearly 20% of its common 
vendors, but the Department of Transportation has no agreements (GAO, 2004). 
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Relevant Information from the Report 
Most agencies have not more aggressively pursued savings through the purchase 
card because a lack of management focus–simply put, the issues have not been the 
center of attention for managers. Furthermore, the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) has not leveraged its governmentwide oversight role by collecting 
and disseminating information on the successful initiatives that some agencies 
have undertaken. (GAO, 2004, para. 2) 
 
Agency officials also express concerns that imposing additional requirements on 
cardholders would undermine the program’s intent to streamline acquisition and 
that pursuing discount agreements with large suppliers would limit their ability to 
provide opportunities for small businesses. (GAO, 2004, para. 2)  
 
To encourage agencies to begin taking steps to capitalize on opportunities for 
savings through the purchase card program, we are making recommendations to 
the OMB, GSA and the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, the Interior, Justice, 
Transportation and Veteran’s Affairs concerning actions that could be taken to 
increase management attention on purchase card pricing issues, such as 
negotiating discount agreements with major vendors, improving cardholder 
training, and developing mechanisms for evaluating cardholders buying practices 
to assess whether cardholders are receiving favorable pricing. (GAO, 2004, p. 4)  
 
GAO-08-333 GOVERNMENTWIDE PURCHASE CARDS: Actions Needed to 
Strengthen Internal Controls to Reduce Fraudulent, Improper and Abusive Purchases  
Four to six years after the first GAO reports that focused on the lack of internal 
controls within the government purchase card program, they are still finding multiple 
agencies with inadequate internal controls and purchase card management programs. 
Basically, agencies are still buying more than the mission requires, paying more than they 
should, not documenting the purchases, and unable to locate items purchased in the past. 
Relevant Information from the Report 
41 percent of transactions were not properly authorized and there was no 
evidence that the goods and services were received by an independent 
party. (GAO, 2008, p. 5) 
Because of the position of the public trust held by federal employees, 
Congress and the American people expect cardholders and Approving 
Officials (AO) to maintain stewardship over the federal funds at their 
disposal. Specifically, purchase cardholders and AOs are expected to 
follow published acquisition requirements and exercise a standard of care 
in acquiring goods and services that is necessary and reasonable (i.e., not 
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extravagant or excessive) for the proper operation of an agency. Because 
every federal dollar that is spent on fraudulent, improper, and abusive 
purchases is a dollar that cannot be used for necessary government goods 
and services; ensuring that purchase cards are used responsibly is of 
particular concern at a time when the United States is experiencing 
substantial fiscal challenges. (GAO, 2008, p. 1) 
According to the GSA, the purchase card program has substantially 
improved procurement efficiencies, which resulted in about $1.8 billion in 
annual savings, as compared to prior paper-based procurement processes. 
GSA also asserted that in FY07, the five credit card banks provided 
government agencies with refunds exceeding $170 million from card 
activity. (GAO, 2008, p. 2) 
GAO-11-152 DAVIS-BACON ACT: Methodological Changes Needed to Improve Wage 
Survey  
There are issues and lack of transparency in how the Department of Labor 
determines prevailing wages in a given state. 
Relevant Information from the Report 
The David-Bacon Act was enacted in 1931, in part, to protect communities and 
workers from the economic disruption caused by contractors hiring lower-wage 
workers from outside their local area, thus obtaining federal construction 
contracts by underbidding competitors who pay local wage rates. Davis-Bacon 
generally requires employers to pay locally prevailing wages and fringe benefits 
to laborers and mechanics employed on federally funded construction projects in 
excess of $2,000. (GAO, 2011, p. 4) 
 
GAO-14-178 FEDERAL CONTRACTING: Commercial Item Test Program Beneficial, 
but Actions Needed to Mitigate Potential Risks  
This report discusses a program intended to make it easier to purchase 
commercial items via contract. Since commercial items are available to anyone on the 
open market, if these items are acceptable to fulfill the government need, then efforts to 
develop a new technology through the acquisition process should be avoided. Restrictions 




Relevant Information from the Report 
GAO found that the [Commercial Item Test Program] reduced contracting lead 
time and administrative burdens and generally did not incur additional risks above 
those on other federal acquisition efforts for those GAO reviewed (GAO, 2014a, 
para. 2). 
 
In 1996, Congress authorized the use of simplified acquisition procedures– 
previously allowed for small purchases–for commercial items not exceeding  
$5 million under the Test Program for Certain Commercial Items (test program). 
Based on the premise that market forces would ensure reasonable prices  
for commercial items, the test program aimed to simplify the contracting process 
by providing contracting officers with additional procedural discretion and 
flexibility for the acquisition of commercial items. Further, effective and efficient 
access to commercial products and services can help agencies achieve their 
missions and save time and administrative costs in an era of constrained budgets. 
(GAO, 2014a, p. 1) 
 
2. Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General Reports 
According to the website, the DOD Office of the Inspector General (OIG) was 
established in 1982 and acts as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense in 
matters of DOD fraud, waste, and abuse. They accomplish this by conducting audits and 
investigations to ensure that the Secretary of Defense and Congress are informed of 
problems in the DOD (OIG, 2014). 
D-2003-109: Summary Report on the Joint Review of Selected DOD Purchase Card 
transactions  
This report emphasizes the use of data mining to enhance the oversight of the 
purchase card program. By using computer programs to search transactions, the data can 
be standardized, will be more time relevant, and will allow better tracking applications. 
Relevant Information from the Report 
In December 2001, the DOD OIG, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
(DFAS), and the DOD Purchase Card Program Management Office (PCPMO) 
agreed to initiate an automated oversight program that could identify through data 
mining techniques anomalies in the purchase card transaction data that might 
indicate potential fraud, waste or abuse. (OIG, 2003, para. 3) 
 
Because DOD cardholders continue to misuse the purchase card, continuous 
monitoring of the program is needed to maintain its credibility with Congress and 
the American public as a cost-efficient method of procurement. To ensure proper 
stewardship of the resources, DOD must implement effective internal controls and 
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comply with established guidelines and standards. We believe effective controls 
can be facilitated by developing an automated oversight program using data 
mining techniques that can detect potentially fraudulent, wasteful, or abusive 
purchase card transactions. (OIG, 2003, p. 11) 
 
Both the Navy and IG DOD envision a prototype system that would send an 
automated e-mail to the appropriate AO requesting additional information for 
assessing the appropriateness of a transaction. The AOs response to questions will 
populate a database, which can be used for reporting trends, identifying 
deficiencies and providing data for fraud or misuse improvement. (OIG, 2003, 
p. 9) 
 
D-2004-076-T: How to Save the Taxpayers Money through Prudent Use of the 
Purchase Card  
Again, focusing on the use of data mining, the OIG found numerous instances of 
fraudulent and inappropriate purchases, as well as lost opportunities to save taxpayer 
money by negotiating for discounts based on the frequency of purchases.  
Relevant Information from the Report 
Data mining is the process of analyzing data from different perspectives to 
identify previously unknown relationships among data, or finding 
correlations or patterns among data and summarizing it into useful 
information. (OIG, 2004, p. 9) 
[Data mining will enable us to determine] which vendors we are buying 
from, the volume of purchases, and the types of purchases. (OIG, 2004, 
p. 13) 
D-2007-043: Controls over the Army, Navy and Air Force Purchase Card Programs  
Lack of internal controls over Convenience Checks (a small portion of the 
purchase card program), closed accounts with balances and poor retention of 
documentation were the main focus of this report.  
Relevant Information from the Report 
Although we identified management control weaknesses at each site we 
visited, we did not consider them material as defined by DOD Instruction 




D-2009-070: Government Purchase Card Controls at United States Special Operations 
Command  
This report determined that controls were in place at two Special Operations 
commands, however those charged with oversight must remain vigilant to avoid creating 
weaknesses where cardholders may circumvent rules (like split purchases) to complete a 
mission. 
Relevant Information from the Report 
Section 2784, title 10, United States Code required the DOD OIG to 
perform periodic audits of the DOD GPC Program to identify: (1) 
potentially fraudulent, improper, and abusive use of purchase cards; (2) 
any pattern of improper cardholder transactions, such as purchases of 
prohibited items; and (3) categories of purchases that should be made by 
means other than the purchase card to better aggregate purchases and 
obtain better prices. (OIG, 2009, p. 1) 
DODIG-2012-043: Army Needs to Identify Government Purchase Card High-Risk 
Transactions 
This report was included because it introduces the Purchase Card On-Line System 
(PCOLS). Similar to the Program Audit Tool (PAT) system used by the Navy, PCOLS is 
a DOD-wide tool for monitoring purchase card use.  
Relevant Information from the Report 
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics (OUSD (AT&L)) PCPMO is responsible for monitoring and issuing 
policy for the DOD GPC. In response to the internal control and policy 
compliance issues, the PCPMO assisted in developing PCOLS, an automated 
system created to examine and identify high-risk transactions. (OIG, 2012, p. 2) 
 
According to DOD documentation, PCOLS is a DOD-wide suite of electronic 
systems that GPC officials use to improve the management and accountability 
within their GPC organizations. PCOLS is comprised of four primary 
applications: Enterprise Monitoring and Management of Accounts; Authorization, 
Issuance, and Maintenance; Data Mining; and Risk Assessment. (OIG, 2012, p. 2) 
 
The Enterprise Monitoring and Management of Accounts and the Authorization, 
Issuance, and Maintenance applications are used to establish cardholder and AO 
information in the PCOLS database. The Data Mining application review, in near 
real-time, GPC transaction using software that identifies correlation, patterns, and 
trends in GPC buying actions. The Risk Assessment application uses internal 
controls and measures, coupled with results from the Data Mining application, to 
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assess and report on the overall “health” of a DOD organization’s GPC program. 
(OIG, 2012, p. 2) 
 
DODIG-2013-061: Improvements Needed to the Purchase Card On-Line System 
This report was attempting to conduct an audit of DOD AO’s to determine if they 
were properly reviewing purchase card transactions that the PCOLS program had flagged 
for further review. The audit was not successful because PCOLS could not provide the 
requested data. However, this article introduced the Defense Procurement and 
Acquisition Policy (DPAP). 
Relevant Information from the Report 
The DPAP was responsible for oversight and issuing policy for the DOD 
GPC Program. To assist DOD with internal control and policy 
compliance, the DPAP awarded a contract for the development of a Data 
Mining and Risk Assessment (DRMA) application as part of an automated 
system, the PCOLS, to examine transactions and identify those that were 
at risk of being noncompliant with laws and other criteria. (OIG, 2013, 
p. 1) 
The DPAP developed the PCOLS to improve controls over the use of the 
GPC program by using a data mining process to identify potentially 
improper GPC transactions. (OIG, 2013, p. 2) 
3. Other Reports or Articles 
 
The Federal Purchase Card: Use, Policy and Best Practice 
This report outlined the history of the purchase card implementation. The idea of 
the purchase card began in 1982 with an executive order to find more efficient ways to 
procure what the government needed. In 1986, the Commerce Department conducted the 
first pilot program using a purchase card, where they found that the purchase card had 
advantages over other procurement methods and should be expanded to include the rest 
of the government. In 1989, OMB turned the program over to GSA to manage because it 




Gaining momentum, in 1993, the National Performance Review noted the 
efficiency of the purchase card and recommended that it include all small purchases 
under $2,500. Many government organizations signed a pledge to expand credit card use 
in their organizations. 
In 1994, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) encouraged purchase 
card use, as it revised 225 statutory rules and simplified procedures for small purchases, 
to include commercial, off the shelf (COTS) items. These changes greatly enhanced the 
opportunities to use the purchase card in the federal government. 
The purchase card provides many opportunities for additional savings: 
Administrative savings: Per transaction cost of one method vs. another 
Refunds: The credit card companies provide the government a refund based on 
purchase dollar volume. 
Electronic Access to Data: Since credit cards are a digital system, it is possible to 
provide accurate, comprehensive details on transactions. 
Safety: Charge cards eliminate the need for imprest funds or cash. 
Worldwide Acceptance: Provides greater access to world-wide merchants. 
 
Relevant Information from the Report 
The purchase card provided a means to purchase products directly from a 
vendor, instead of processing requests through government procurement 
offices. (AGA, 2006, p. 5) 
By reducing paperwork and the time involved in small purchases, both 
cost savings and service delivery were enhanced with the use of the 
purchase card. (AGA, 2006, p. 4) 
It is used as a means of improving procurement efficiency by reducing or 
eliminating paperwork associated with requisitions, purchase orders, and 
invoices for small-dollar acquisition transactions. (AGA, 2006, p. 4) 
Survey indicates that purchase card misuse accounts on average for .017 
percent of purchase card spending at state and federal agencies, which is 
the equivalent of $170 of misuse for every $1 million of purchase card 
spending. This is lower than any other institution, including .020 percent 
at private and public corporations, .032 percent at universities and .091 at 




Assessment of the Micro-Purchase Threshold Initiative 
 In 2012, the Sterling Heritage Corporation completed a report to the Program 
Development and Implementation Office, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy 
(DPAP) that interviewed stakeholders in contracting and purchase card positions, 
discussing the risks, benefits, and recommendations of increasing the purchase card 
transaction limit to $10,000. The premise of this study was based on the expected cost 
savings that DFAS might see if they no longer had to process payments to vendors for 
contracts below $10,000. 
The purchase card limit is a current issue, continually being looked at by those 
wishing to cut costs and be more efficient. This report was focused on the DFAS costs of 
submitting payments to vendors; it did not consider potential cost savings associated with 
not needing to write a contract in the first place or how the time saved would impact 
mission readiness. 
The report surmised that if the purchase limit were increased and contracting 
offices saw a decrease in workload, units would see a similar increase in workload. That 
is unlikely to happen. First, as a rule, multiple units utilize a single contracting office, so 
a drastic reduction in contracting workload would not equate to a drastic increase to an 
individual unit. Also, for a unit, the work required to initiate and complete a contract 
request is more complicated and time-intensive than a purchase card request (there is 
extra paperwork to complete, more follow-ups, and extended waiting times). Therefore, 
the workload in a unit may shift to another person within the unit; however, the unit will 
still experience an overall decrease in workload and time commitment. 
Relevant Information from the Report 
By removing only the less complex payments from the process, the 
average cost and the associated processing rate charged by DFAS will 
increase. (SHC, 2012, p. 2-1) 
Some cardholders are not routinely rotating supply sources; instead 
showing favoritism to certain vendors. This interviewee believes that 
increasing the threshold will “open more doors” to this non-competitive 
practice. (SHC, 2012, p. 2-2) 
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An increase in the threshold would not be worth the effort unless the 
dollar thresholds associated with the Davis-Bacon and Service Contract 
Acts were increased in parallel. (SHC, 2012, p. 2-2) 
Contract Specialists and Contracting Officers [could] focus on more 
complex contract issues and procurements as a result of the associated 
reduced workload. (SHC, 2012, p. 2-3) 
[Many] believe operational effectiveness and readiness will accompany an 
increase in the threshold. (SHC, 2012, p. 2-4) 
OMB Circular A-123: Improving the Management of Government Charge Card 
Programs 
Although this is a Federal memorandum that covers all charge cards, it is 
important because the banks who issue these credit cards use this as a positive internal 
control of government programs. The bank associated with the Navy’s purchase card 
program cited this document as one of the controls the government had in place to reduce 
the risk of fraud and misuse (OMB, 2009). 
Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2012 
This Act specifies amendments for purchase card program, specifically in 
government-wide safeguards and internal controls (Congress, 2012). The bank associated 
with the Navy’s purchase card program cited this document as one of the controls the 
government has in place to reduce the risk of fraud and misuse.  
 
N2005-0014: Naval Supply Systems Command Commercial Purchase Card Program 
This report was included because it provides amplifying information about the 
PPMAP team. 
Relevant Information from the Report 
[Naval Supply Systems Command] established the Procurement 
Performance Management Assessment Program process as a tool to 
provide additional oversight of activity purchase card programs. This 
process is a method of reviewing, assessing, and reporting on the purchase 
card program at each activity. It consists of transactional reviews, an 
internal management review, and a review of other specific purchase 
elements. (NAS, 2004, p. 1)  
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A Brief History and Review of Purchasing Card Use by the U.S. Government: 1990–
2005 
This article provided an overview of the history of the purchase card. It listed all 
government actions leading up to the pilot programs, as well as those that redirected 
policies. It discussed the initial emphasis on the purchase card, which led to various 
commands with 30% of the workforce authorized a credit card, reaching an all-time high 
in 2000–2001. During this time of excess, the oversight was not sufficient and there were 
many high-profile cases of fraud and abuse. These are highlighted in the GAO and OIG 
reports already discussed.  
Relevant Information from the Report 
Purchase cards have received much attention as a tool to help U.S. Federal 
government employees acquire small-dollar goods from suppliers in a 
cost-effective and timely manner. Purchases under $2,500 have been 
estimated by the GSA to account for a meager 2% of total federal 
government spending, but 85% of total procurement transaction volume. 
Purchase cards expedite payment to suppliers and reduce or eliminate the 
paperwork associated with requisitions, purchase orders, invoices and 
checks. (Gupta & Palmer, 2008, p. 174) 
Federal government cost savings by use of purchase cards [instead of a 
contract] have ranged from $54 to $92 per transaction. (Gupta & Palmer, 
2008, p. 175) 
Purchase cards have been found to reduce the time required to process 
paperwork transactions by two to six weeks. (Gupta & Palmer, 2008, p. 
175) 
After fifteen years of use by U.S. Federal government agencies, purchase 
cards are still caught in a debate between the drive to improve government 
efficiency and the need to prudently manage and control spending of 
taxpayer resources. (Gupta & Palmer, 2008, p. 177) 
Every type of procure-to-payment process has an inherent risk of error and 
abuse which the government, through technology and administrative and 
management activities, attempts to minimize and control. (Gupta & 
Palmer, 2008, p. 191) 
While anecdotal evidence of card misuse is easy to find, there is no proof 
that significant card misuse exists in the Federal Government. The limited 
research that exists indicates that purchase card misuse in aggregate is 
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very small and below the levels of card misuse found in the private sector. 
(Gupta & Palmer, 2008, p. 191) 
In a survey by Palmer et al., 579 purchase card using organizations 
reported, in aggregate that purchase card misuse represented 0.027% of 
purchase card spending, or $270 per $1 million spent. (Gupta & Palmer, 
2008, p. 191) 
The Foundations of Government Contracting 
This article overviews the history of contracting, dating from the adoption of 
England’s contracting principles. It cited multiple procurement issues from the 
Revolutionary War to the Civil War that can still be seen as issues today. It discussed 
inherent and historical instances, citing that contracting has always been rife with misuse 
and fraud.  
Relevant Information from the Report 
Government spending in this country has always been a primary–if 
sometimes unintended–driver of economic, industrial, social, and 
scientific development. (Keeney, 2007, p. 7) 
The cycle of waste, fraud, and abuse on the part of both contractors and 
government employees has echoed down the years since the colonial days. 
Abuses and the ensuing public scandals produce an increasing maze of 
government regulation. The tangle of red tape has caused responsible 
contractors from colonial farmer to modern industrial suppliers to refuse to 
do business with the government. As one new government employee said, 
when first exposed to the morass of regulations, “Who in their right mind 
would subject themselves to this?” (Keeney, 2007, p. 7) 
D. SUMMARY OF FOLLOWING 
In order to get a clear picture of the size and scope of contracts and purchase card 
transactions in the Navy, this project needed to sort the raw data received from Naval 
sources involved with procurement–the Fleet Logistics Center (FLC) and the 
Consolidated Card Program Management Division (CCPMD). Although this research 
topic deals primarily with the purchase card program, it cannot build an accurate picture 
of the purchase card without considering the effect of contracts. Contract data was 
received from FLC and purchase card data was obtained from CCMPD. A listing of 
purchase card authority was also received from the PPMAP team. Once the data from 
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both purchasing programs had been collected, it was sorted for relevant information and 
put it into a format suitable for discussion. In Chapter IV, the data from these two 
procurement sources will be analyzed and compared.  
1. FLC Contract Data 
Fleet Logistics Center (FLC) is the contracting arm of the Navy. All units under 
their purview or region that cannot purchase items using the stock system or the purchase 
card will submit a contract request to FLC for procurement. FLC provided data about the 
number and value of all contracts from FY10-13 for analysis. Each year had 
approximately 35,000 line items; however, this study is focused on the contracts below 
$25,000, and reduced the line items to approximately 20,000 per year.  
Since it is not possible to display all the information, Figures 2 and 3 summarize 
each year’s data in two charts which compare the total dollar value of contracts let in 
Figure 2 to the number of contracts produced in Figure 3. Since this study focuses on 
contracts between $3,000 and $25,000, the figures are laid out in that manner. In Figure 
2, despite the changes in funding from year to year, contracts between $3,000 and 
$25,000 make up only 2–3% of the contract funds spent each year, whereas Figure 3 
shows those same contracts represent 43–47% of contracts written. 
 
Figure 2.  FLC Contracts Let by Dollar Amount (after FLC, 2013) 
 29
 
Figure 3.  FLC Contracts Let by Volume (after FLC, 2013) 
It is significant to notice that Figures 2 and 3 also show that contracts below 
$3,000 take up 30% of resources and only encompass 0–1% of the funds spent. These 
contracts are included in the chart because there are certain circumstances when 
purchases under the $3,000 purchase card limit must still go to contracting. First, if there 
is a service or requirement that needs “terms and conditions,” it must be completed by 
contract. Second, due to the responsibility and risk associated, all airplane parts and non-
common use hazardous material (HAZMAT) must be contracted. Without a contract, 
there is no control or recourse if the wrong part is ordered, delivered, is defective, does 
not function as required, or causes a mishap. These are some of the protections that are 
not available when using a purchase card. 
This data, along with the data from the next section, will be compared and 
analyzed in Chapter IV. 
2. CCMPD Purchase Card Data 
The Consolidated Card Program Management Division (CCPMD) is the program 
and policy arm of all card programs in the Navy. According to the CCPMD website, they 
“provide centralized operational control and management of Department of the Navy 
(DON) financial card programs and selected electronic transaction systems” (NAVSUP, 
 30
2014). CCPMD is the main source of training, information, and guidance for all 
cardholders, AOs, and Agency Program Coordinators (APC) in the Navy. 
CCPMD provided data about the number and value of all Navy purchase card 
transactions from FY10-13. The data sets in Figures 4 and 5 are comparable to the 
contracting data collected in Figures 2 and 3. 
Figure 4 shows the value of all purchase card transactions in each year, while 
Figure 5 shows the number of transactions made.  
 
Figure 4.  Navy Purchase Card Purchases ($) (after CCPMD, 2014) 
Figure 4 shows that almost one-third of purchase card spending is for transactions 
over the $3,000 purchase limit. These are made of up two types of transactions: method 
of payment (MOP) purchases where a contract is paid using the unit purchase card rather 
than DFAS; or, if a cardholder has the authority to purchase up to $25,000 for training 
requirements or to purchase up to $150,000 against special existing contracts, like blanket 
purchase agreements (BPA) or indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (ID/IQ) contracts 
for repetitive orders. This authority is discussed further in the next section.  
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Figure 5.   Navy Purchase Card Transactions (#) (after CCPMD, 2014) 
Figure 5 shows that transactions below $3,000 make up 97% of the purchases in 
the program. Although a third of the funds associated with the purchase card are for items 
over $3,000 there are not a significant number of these transactions. 
According to CCPMD, although it changes almost daily, there are currently  
9,762 cardholders in the Navy making the 1.17 million purchase card transactions worth 
$1.14 billion in Figures 4 and 5. Compare that to a GAO investigation in 2001, where the 
Navy holds the second largest DOD purchase card program with 28,000 cardholders 
making 2.8 million transactions worth $1.8 billion (GAO, 2002). 
This data, along with the contracting data in the previous section will be analyzed 
and compared in Chapter IV. 
3. PPMAP Authority Data 
The Procurement Performance Management Assessment Program (PPMAP) 
process was established by NAVSUP: 
as a tool to provide additional oversight of activity purchase card 
programs. This process is a method of reviewing, assessing, and reporting 
on the purchase card program at each activity. It consists of transactional 
reviews, an internal management review, and a review of other specific 
purchase elements. (NAS, 2004, p. 1)  
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The PPMAP team visits each command under their purview every 18 months in 
order to audit their purchase card program. This particular team interviewed oversees 187 
shore-based commands.  
a.  Types of Purchase Card Authority 
The various types of purchase card programs available depend on the level of 
training and purchasing power granted to the program. A purchase card program can be 
given the ability to order beyond the $3,000 threshold, if the cardholder has completed 
the required training. This training, called CON 237 in the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU) curriculum, can result in a 1402 contract authority given to the 
cardholder. Although highly recommended, it is not required for the AO and APC to 
complete the training, as long as the cardholder holds the certification.  
(1) Most commands have the normal authority to purchase up to $3,000.  
(2) Some commands have established “ordering 1” authority where they can 
purchase up to $150,000 in supplies from established mandatory sources 
and BPAs, for example.  
(3) Fewer commands have “ordering 2” authority where they can purchase up 
to $150,000 in supplies and services from mandatory sources, like ID/IQs 
and BPAs. 
Figure 6 summarizes the purchase card authorities granted to shore commands 
under the auditing purview of one regional PPMAP team. There are several other teams 
assigned to audit other shore commands around the world, and there are several Afloat 
Training Groups that focus on auditing sea-based commands.  
 
Figure 6.  Types of Purchase Card Authority (after PPMAP, 2014)  
Normal business data was collected from entities that represent two of the three 
procurement options for an operational unit. Stock system purchases are not considered 
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for this study. The data shows a summary of all FLC contracts written and all Navy 
purchase card purchases for FY10–13. This information will be compared and analyzed 
further in Chapter IV. 
Although this is helpful data, further research was necessary to (1) discover how 
frequently contact requirements are initiated by operational units (ships) and (2) how long 
the contracting process takes before it can be determined if an increase in the purchase 
card limit is needed to better support operational readiness.  
In Chapter III, data will be presented that was not immediately available, meaning 
it was sought out through end users and subject matter experts (SME) mostly via 
interviews. Information gathered from these interviews was consolidated and presented in 
























III. DATA PRESENTATION 
The previous chapters discussed the possibility of increasing the purchase card 
limits, looked at this history of the program, and provided data on how many contract and 
purchase card purchases occurred over the last four years in the Navy. While this is 
important information, it only provides one piece of the purchasing picture. In this 
chapter, the operational end users of these purchasing methods will be examined, the 
process required for contracts will be explained, and a review of auditing and misuse in 
the Navy will be presented. In addition, purchase card programs in industry will be 
compared and information gathered from a commercial bank will explain how purchase 
card programs are administered, both in government and private sectors. 
The remaining data for this project was not immediately available and was 
collected by asking subject matter experts (SME) for information in the form of 
interviews, walk-throughs, and data requests. 
Once this data was obtained, stakeholders at all levels of the purchase card 
program were contacted and presented the data to voice their feedback and 
recommendations. This critical information was incorporated into the data collection and 
considered when making final recommendations. 
1. Supply Officer Data 
Supply Officers are the “businessmen” of the Navy. Stationed at nearly every 
command, they are generally in charge of purchasing everything that is required for the 
mission. The previous chapter showed the data for all contract and purchase card 
transactions in the Navy. To consider the effects at a single unit, this study needed to 
learn how large a typical purchase card program in the Navy is, and how frequently a unit 
requires a contract. Operational Supply Officers were contacted to request data about the 
purchase card program and the extent of contract requests from FY10-13. This particular 
sub-set of Supply Officers was chosen because there is a consistent method of contact for 
those assigned to a ship.  
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a. Purchase Card Data 
In order to find out how large a typical operational purchase card program was, 
this study contacted 78 operational Supply Officers requesting data about purchase card 
transactions.  
These were the purchase card questions: 
(1) Are you Agency Program Coordinator (APC) in your program? 
(2) How many Approving Officials (AO) are in your program? 
(3) How many cardholders are in your program? 
(4) On average, how many (#) purchase card purchases are made in a month? 
(5) On average, how much ($) is spent on your purchase card each month? 
(6) What recorded cases of misuse have occurred in your current program? 
(7) What recorded cases of misuse have occurred at past commands? 
(8) Does this program have stricter controls than required by instruction?  
(9) Do you have any cardholders who are not in your chain of command? 
(10) What items are the most difficult to procure with current purchasing rules? 
Of the 78 Supply Officers contacted, 21 (27%) provided data for the purchase 
card questions. The responses are summarized in Figure 7, which shows that most ships 
maintain small purchase card operations, just large enough to maintain redundancy in 
order to cover leave and emergency issues. With some math, the data also shows that the 
average purchase card transaction is almost $1,300.  
Figure 7 also indicates a great variance in the use of the purchase card. All the 
ships that responded are at least the size of a destroyer, with a few each of cruisers, 
carriers, and amphibious ships. While small, this sample is indicative of any collection of 
ships at any time. Variances in data follow the various stages of deployment preparations 





Figure 7.  Purchase Card Data by Ship 
Of the 21 responders, only five commands reported internal control actions in 
excess of what is required by the NAVSUPINST 4200.99B. The increased controls 
implemented include: 
Department Heads must approve departmental purchase card requests 
Department Head meetings are used to prioritize purchase card requests 
Voluntary additional Program Audit Tool (PAT) screenings 
Purchase card requests over $1,500 are signed by the Commanding Officer 
Extra screening is done to ensure rotation of vendors and prevent misuse 
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No Supply Officer reported misuse at the current command or in a previous 
command. Four commands reported a questionable incident that was either reversed 
without issue or had experienced an actual third-party fraud where the command was not 
held liable for the charges. 
Supply Officers retain the position of APC in 18 of 21 commands. The remaining 
three are in very large operations that push the authority down to a more junior Supply 
Officer whose day-to-day activities put them in a better position to monitor the card 
activity. None of the Supply Officers have authorized purchase cards to be issued outside 
of the financial division of the ship. 
Supply Officers were asked what items caused the most difficulties based on 
current purchasing methods; for example, items that are not in the stock system, those 
that exceed the purchase card limit, and items that are required sooner than the stock 
system can provide. This author expected to receive reports of engineering coveralls, as 
these are consistently backordered in the stock system. What surprised the author (who 
generally concurred) was that there were so many other valid items to consider: radios, 
equipment hoses (organic sources cannot certify them fast enough, so commercial 
sources are needed), ADP (computer) equipment (the Information Technology 
Procurement Review (ITPR) is very time consuming), food service uniforms (even small 
orders quickly exceed purchase card limits), habitability items (rack curtains and parts 
can quickly exceed the limits), CO2 bottles, photo equipment, medical and dental 
supplies, dragger tubes for damage control (stock system orders arrive expired), any non-
standard part over the purchase card threshold, obsolete parts, boat parts, SPY parts, 
cherry-pickers, special suits for Hot Suit Men, urgent services for defueling, oily waste 
offloads, and hydro testing on SCBAs (breathing devices for divers).  
Although it was not information we requested, many Supply Officers expressed a 
desire to increase the purchase card limit, mostly to assist in short fuse requirements 
and/or purchasing the items in the previous paragraph. Some felt a slight increase 
($3,500-$4,500) would be appropriate, while others thought $10,000 would better support 
the majority of the needs.  
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Some Supply Officers were skeptical that raising the purchase card limit would 
actually solve anything. They suspect that vendors frequently adjust their prices to meet 
purchase card limits, and predicted vendors would just adjust prices upward to match the 
new limit. 
b. Contract Data 
A total of 78 Supply Officers were contacted to provide information about the 
contracts they have sent to Fleet Logistics Center (FLC) in the last four years. These were 
the contract questions: 
(11) What contracts below $25,000 were sent to FLC? (No port costs) 
(12) Were any contract requests below $3,000?  
(13) Were any contract requests Sole Source?  
(14) Were any Urgent?  
Unfortunately, this is data that ships do not track in a format that is conducive to 
data collections. Of those contacted, 16 (21%) ships were able to locate or create enough 
suitable data to cover two years. Although not as much data was available as hoped, it 
provided enough information to get a general idea of operational contract use. Figure 8 
shows the number of contracts each ship sent to FLC during 2012 and 2013, and gives 
the sum of those contracts. The Average column shows how many contracts each ship 
would do in a given year, and the average cost of each of those contracts. 
Again, the ship’s mission and where they fall in the deployment cycles can greatly 
affect the ship’s budget and number of contracts required. 
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Figure 8.  Contracts Submitted to FLC by Ships 
What this chart really shows that is that ships do not utilize FLC very often; and 
when they do, the contract has an average value of $14,400. There are several reasons 
that might keep a ship from requiring a contract. First, most repair parts (and many other 
items) for ships are available within the stock system. Second, most day to day 
requirements at smaller commands are of a low dollar value and fall within the purchase 
card rules. Third, an operational command is generally extremely busy and under 
constant pressure to take care of issues immediately. The paperwork and time 
requirements involved with initiating a contract are viewed as insurmountable by most 
divisions on the ship. Every possible option available will be considered and attempted 
prior to undertaking a contract request, to include begging, borrowing, and 
cannibalization, which is stealing with permission.  
No ship initiated a contract for items below $3,000. This question was asked 
because there are a significant number of contract requests going to FLC that are below 
$3,000 and this study wanted to determine what types of requirements those might be. 
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Most port costs are not below $3,000, but those that are usually must be contracted 
because they are almost always a service that requires “terms & conditions.” 
When looking at ship data it is important to consider that when a ship submits 
contract requests to FLC, many will require special attention because there are few 
manufacturers or there is a time crunch. Both of these situations require FLC to drop 
other contracts in progress and apply resources to those more recent, but urgent requests. 
Generally, a contract request sent to FLC requires quotes from three separate 
vendors be included in the package. If a ship cannot locate three vendors that can provide 
the needed item, a Sole Source justification memorandum must be submitted as part of 
the package.  
A contract generally takes about 40 days to process before a ship will receive the 
contracted item. Occasionally, a ship will have an urgent requirement that is needed more 
quickly than a standard contract timeline. An Urgency Impact statement needs to be 
created to justify why FLC should shift focus to this more important request. The 
Urgency Impact statement must be submitted as part of the request package.  
Looking at two years of contract data, Figure 9 shows how many total contracts 
each ship sent to FLC and of those, how many contract requests were sent as Sole Source 
and how many were Urgent. Finally, there were a significant number of requests that 
were both a Sole Source and Urgent requirement.  
Figure 9 shows that Ship 2, for example, submitted 29 contracts in the last 
2 years. Seven of 29 requests were Sole Source and seven of 29 requests were Urgent. 
However five of those 29 requirements represent requirements that were actually both 
Sole Source and Urgent.  
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Figure 9.  Ship Contract Requests Sent to FLC 
The last line of Figure 9 shows that of all the ship contracts submitted to FLC, 
33% only have one source available and 22% require a faster than normal response. 
Separately, 15% of all contracts submitted by ships are time-sensitive requirements with 
only one known source. These are the perfect scenarios where an increase in the purchase 
card limit could alleviate unnecessary, high-pressure work at FLC. 
When comparing the typical transactions taking place on a ship, it is clear that 
purchase cards make up a bulk of the transactions outside the stock system. Figure 10 
shows how many contract and purchase card transactions an average ship conducts in a 
year and the proportion of business allocated to each procurement method.  
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Figure 10.  Average Transactions per Year for an Average Ship2 
 Something to consider is how the various procurement processes differ at the 
operational level. There are three basic procurement methods available to a ship: the 
stock system, the purchase card, and sending a contract request to FLC. Figure 11 shows 
how a sailor with a requirement would travel through the four (or so) levels of authority 
at a typical command in order to get a needed item, depending on the type of 
procurement needed. 
 
Figure 11.  Unit Level Purchase Request Process 
                                                 
2 The purchase card numbers are based on an average purchase load per month (Figure 7) and 
multiplied by 12. Although unlikely, it is possible that some average monthly purchase card numbers 
included a Method of Payment (MOP) purchase, which is a contract that is paid using the credit card. 
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Visually, the stock system is the easiest procurement method for the end user. 
Work Centers are already entering maintenance information in the Operational 
Maintenance Management System–Next Generation (OMMS–NG). OMMS–NG tracks 
preventative and corrective maintenance actions for most ship systems and interfaces 
with Relational Supply (RSUPPLY), the system used to order parts. A purchase card 
request requires more documentation and the process is not automated, but it is still fairly 
easy for the end user once they do it a couple times. A contract request requires more 
paperwork and more reviews at each level of the process; and because contracts are done 
so infrequently at all levels, a request will likely be returned numerous times in the 
process for questions and missing or incomplete documentation. 
 Figure 12 takes the information from Figure 11 and breaks it into a timeline of the 
purchase card and contract process, in hours. There are three speeds at which a request 
can travel through the process: “as fast as,” would indicate that everything was completed 
quickly and correctly the first time. The quotes were easy to find, supervisors were easy 
to locate, information was quickly provided, the funds were available, and no ship 
evolutions prevented the cardholder from making the purchase immediately. The 
“typical” path would indicate that information and people were not as easy to find and 
ship evolutions prevented a fast resolution. If the process is “as slow as,” it means that 
things were more difficult, the internet went down, people were on watch or off ship, 
funding was not available, and there was a fire drill in Supply Support.  
 
 
Figure 12.  Process Time (in Hours) for a Unit Request  
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Figure 12 shows that a typical contract package can take three days (or as many as 
12) to compile before it is sent to FLC. The FLC process is addressed in the next section.  
2. Fleet Logistics Center Interview 
Several articles and Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports (see 
Chapter II Literature Review) have stated that completing purchases by purchase card is 
more economical and efficient than doing so by contract. This is logical because by using 
the credit card, you can keep transactions “in house.” A contract has to be sent to another 
entity to manage, thereby requiring at least two sets of people to touch it. Also, a contract 
is more complex, has more steps, requires more research, and takes more time to process 
than a purchase card request.  
If pulling work away from the contracting command is being considered, a better 
understanding of the contracting process from start to finish would be required. Figure 13 
illustrates the process a contract request would go through. Each box represents a 
different person and/or functional area within the process, most being accomplished 




Figure 13.  FLC Contract Process (after FLC, 2014) 
In Figure 13, the solid arrows indicate the primary path of progress. The dashed 
arrows represent possible extra steps that may be required, depending on how complete 
the contract request when received by the FLC. 
The FLC contract process begins when a unit uploads the contract request 
package through a data portal called the Funding Document Manager (FDM) and the 
Comptroller enters FDM to view the contract. Once approved for appropriate purpose, 
time, and amount by the Comptroller, the contract will become visible to the Procurement 
Technician in FDM. The Tech will print the document(s) and assemble a complete 
package for review by the Technical Screener. The Technical Screener will verify that all 
pieces of the contract request have been received and will contact the unit directly if 
anything is missing or needs clarification. Once complete, the package will be forwarded 
to another screener, the Division Director (or Lead) for Afloat/Operational requests, 
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Shore-based requests or Regional Maintenance Center requests, as appropriate. The 
Division Director will screen the requests again, this time focusing on the completeness 
and sufficiency of the information. Once the Division Director has determined the request 
is “procurement ready,” it will get assigned to a Buyer. Once the Buyer has received the 
contract request, they have 30 days to secure the contract. 
Figure 14 was produced by setting the information in Figure 13 to a timeline. This 
timeline is very similar to the ship process timeline; however this only addresses the 
portion of the contract process after the unit uploaded the request in FDM. Similarly, if 
the process goes “as fast as,” every person is sitting at their desk actively waiting for the 
arrival of a new contract request, each step is completed immediately, and it is quickly 
sent to the next person. The “typical” process has people that only check the system a 
couple of times a day, have a meeting or two to attend, are assisting someone, and are 
working on another request. If the contract request takes “as much as,” it may have 
arrived after working hours, needed more information, competition research was difficult, 
other contracts were more important, and/or it was a complicated contract that required 
more examination by the Buyer. 
 
Figure 14.  Linear FLC Contract Timeline (in Hours) (after FLC, 2014) 
It is important to note that if a contract request has an Urgency Impact statement, 
the Buyer can rush it through the system; but the process will go much faster if it is a 
commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) item or a readily available service.  
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3. PPMAP Auditing Interview 
Charged with providing oversight to shore-based Navy commands, the 
Procurement Performance Management Assessment Program (PPMAP) team has an 
overall view of the issues surrounding the purchase card program. Their purpose is to 
visit each command under their purview every 18 months to ensure they are following the 
rules and regulations of the purchase card program and that the internal controls are being 
used as directed. This interview was included because the prevalence of misuse was 
discussed, along with other consistent issues within the purchase card program across the 
Navy. This particular team oversees 187 shore-based commands. 
 
Misuse of the Purchase Card 
Misuse has always been a risk when handling public funds. Misuse is divided into 
three general categories: purchasing something that is allowed but should be purchased 
thru other means (like a mandatory source), purchasing something in excess of what is 
needed (like stocking up on items that go obsolete quickly), and purchasing something 
for personal gain.  
Misuse with the government purchase card for personal gain was brought to light 
in the early 2000s when some high profile and alarming examples of misuse caused the 
government to tighten the internal controls and increase the support to those charged with 
auditing the purchase card. By 2002, the regulations, training, and auditing resources 
were starting to increase and improve dramatically. The new instructions not only gave 
more guidance to the cardholder, but also delineated how the PPMAP personnel were to 
oversee and audit the program. 
Currently, there are no misuse concerns with the 187 commands they oversee. 
99% of cardholders, AOs, and APCs just want to do their jobs and do them well. The 
most difficult thing with auditing a card program is that constant personnel turnover can 
hurt a purchase card program. When there are so many turnovers, the learning curve is 
constantly steep as knowledge is lost again and again, continuity suffers as no one can 
recall transactions from the past, and records tend to be retained in haphazard manners. 
Additionally, when the cardholder, AO, or APC is military, they rarely spend more than 
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50% of their time focused on purchase card issues. When the position is filled by a 
civilian, it is more likely to be their full-time job. Civilian workers also increase the 
likelihood of maintaining a corporate knowledge about history and procedures, as there is 
less turnover with those positions. 
4. Afloat Training Group Interview  
The ATG purchase card inspectors are Logistics Specialist Master Chiefs, who 
have been in the Navy, using these programs for more than 20 years. After interviewing 
the shore purchase card auditors, it was important to interview the inspectors of the at sea 
programs.  
According to the website, an Afloat Training Group “provides dynamic, quality 
afloat training to Navy and Coast Guard Sailors to ensure a combat ready force capable 
of performing a broad spectrum of maritime missions” (ATG, 2014). In addition to 
training, they also audit and inspect most programs on the ship.  
The ATG inspectors interviewed believed that electronic audits (like PAT) are not 
sufficient enough to maintain the level of integrity and oversight necessary to keep 
purchase cardholders honest. The consistent arrival of auditors is needed to provide an 
unbiased inspection of the process. This is also a valuable learning and training tool that 
is not available with electronic systems. 
As a general rule, the purchase card programs at sea suffer from a lack of training, 
a lack of involvement by the APC, and reluctance by upper level APCs to suspend 
accounts for violations. Although misuse for personal gain is not prevalent in these 
programs, accountability issues do exist and cardholders are not consistently being 
reprimanded. APCs should be more proactive, more involved in the oversight process, 
and should be administering appropriate corrective and disciplinary actions. 
5. Industry Purchase Card Program Interviews 
After interviewing and analyzing the government purchase card data, the next step 
was studying how for-profit entities used and managed their purchase card program. 
Executives were interviewed from four companies that have a similar make up to the 
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military or U.S. Navy–they do not produce anything substantial and they are capital and 
labor intensive. Represented are a major airline, a college campus, a trucking company, 
and an engineering company. The intent was to get an overall picture of industry 
purchase card programs to compare the risks and the costs with the government system.  
Regional and national companies were contacted for interviews because their 
corporate financial offices were less difficult to reach using consumer contact 
information. A personal contact for the engineering company was obtained for an 
interview, which was by far the largest company contacted and most likely provided the 
best comparison to the Navy program.  
These are the questions asked during the interviews: 
(1) How many cardholders are in your program? Are they within purchasing? 
(2) What training is required to become a cardholder? Is credit considered? 
(3) How does cardholder supervision/oversight work? 
(4) What controls are in place? What are they allowed to purchase? 
(5) How frequently are there occasions of misuse? 
Figure 15 is a chart is a summary that compares the interviewed company 
practices for span of control, what can be purchased, individual purchase limits, internal 
controls, and frequency of misuse. The assumption was that for-profit companies might 
choose to have different controls on their program than the government to even out the 
balance between risk and keeping the program economical.  
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Figure 15.  Comparison of Industry Purchase Card Programs 
The for-profit companies have loose controls on purchases. While most 
cardholders tended to have lower purchasing limits, they had no pre-approval process on 
purchases, with the exception of a few designated items. All transactions were reviewed 
after the fact using the monthly bank statement. Most of the companies had strict policies 
for providing receipts to match statements; however, many receipts are not detailed 
enough to identify exactly what was purchased. The for-profit companies have no 
mechanism to determine what was purchased once memories have faded or people 
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transferred. Each company did have a few specific items that required approval in 
advance. 
The next four sections describe each company program in detail. 
a. Major Airline Interview 
The director of the purchase card program at a major airline was interviewed. This 
company has nearly 500 cardholders scattered throughout 90 airports in North America. 
An additional 17 cardholders are located within the divisions of the corporate office. The 
purchase card is used for normal business expenses: company travel, supplies, and things 
like rebooking cancelled customer flights.  
There is one credit card administrator who is in charge of overseeing, issuing, 
reviewing, and auditing the credit card program. The administrator will set the card 
parameters for each cardholder upon issue and adjust as needed. As a rule, a cardholder is 
limited to $1,000 per transaction and $2,500–$5,000 per month. Merchant category codes 
(MCC) are utilized to prevent purchases at establishments that are not considered normal 
places of business for an airline. This is a corporate liability purchase card program, 
which means that the company is backing the purchase card activity, not the cardholder; 
so they do not conduct individual credit checks before issuing someone a card. 
Purchases are approved by the supervisor at the end of the billing cycle. After the 
purchases have been made and the statement and receipts are received, the supervisor will 
review all transactions and ask for additional documentation, as needed.  
There are zero to two intentional misuse incidents each year. Other misuse issues 
are accidental and due to confusing travel reimbursement rules. There are infrequent 
instances where a small dollar item will end up on a receipt, like a pack of gum or a 






b.  College Campus Interview 
The financial director at a local community college was interviewed. There are 
100 cardholders scattered among the 60 departments of the campus. The purchase card is 
used mostly for office supplies. 
The credit card oversight is set up with an overall administrator who oversees  
the program from the procurement department. Via computer program, they have the 
ability to change credit and purchase limits, suspend a card, and block MCCs. They do 
not allow split purchases that circumvent the purchase limit. A typical cardholder will 
have $1,000 per transaction and $5,000 per month limits. However, it can be higher or 
lower depending on need. This is a corporate liability program, so credit checks are not 
conducted prior to card issuance. 
At least one person in each department has fiscal authority, depending on the size 
of the department. This person may oversee up to six purchase cardholders within their 
department. Monthly statements are retrieved using a software program. Timely 
reconciliation is expected and receipts are to be presented to the departmental fiscal 
representative with the monthly statement. Once the package is passed to the 
procurement department, it will be reviewed for inappropriate purchases. For example, 
they will check to see if it should have been purchased through a purchase order or 
service contract, instead of with a purchase card. 
This college has well-published rules and guidelines and each cardholder affirms 
that they have read and understood them. A new cardholder also signs a conflict of 
interest form, attends a credit card orientation, and completes ethics and conflict of 
interest training before being issued a purchase card. 
The college has few incidents of misuse, less than one incident per year. Most of 
these incidents are accidents that are quickly noticed and easily reversed.  
c. Trucking Company Interview 
The purchase card manager at a trucking company was interviewed. There are  
15 purchase cardholders in this company, located at various terminals throughout the 
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country. They remain within the purchasing department at each terminal, and are 
overseen by the corporate office.  
The purchase card is primarily used for emergency purposes, as they have a 
special contract for office supplies. They generally only have 4–5 purchases per month 
for a total of less than $5,000. They have tight controls on the use of their purchase card, 
based mostly on the trust built through many years of service with the company.  
They do not allow capital equipment to be purchased with the purchase card. 
They had purchase card issues many years ago where cardholders were making 
purchases but not providing receipts to match the charges. Since then, the new controls in 
place have eliminated that behavior. 
d.  Engineering Company Interview 
A senior procurement manager at an engineering company that does business with 
the government was interviewed. There are 1000 cardholders in the program, including 
60 that only make purchases on government projects. This company has the two separate 
purchase card programs because the government purchase card has less restrictive rules 
than the company program and it is easier for invoicing if the purchases for one project 
are all on the same purchase card. 
In order to become a cardholder, an employee needs to read the policy and score 
100% on an online course about the policy. Every employee in the company has to take 
annual ethics training. Cardholders need to take an annual recertification test, half of 
which is made up of current issues in the purchase card program. 
Cardholders are scattered among the company’s many projects and divisions. Up 
to 10 cardholders (depending on project or division size) are supervised by a Cardholder 
Manager, who reviews the monthly billing statements and matches receipts before 
forwarding the entire package to the Purchase Card Program Manager. The Program 
Manager uses an online software program in conjunction with the bank to build queries, 
look at statistics, and monitor spending patterns of all cardholders within the company. 
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In addition to the computer program, other controls in place are $2,500 
transaction limits ($3,000 for government projects) and $25,000 monthly limit. These 
limits are reviewed quarterly and can be temporarily or permanently increased, depending 
on the project needs. Cardholders are not allowed to contact the bank, unless their card 
has been stolen or used without permission. MCCs are used to prevent use at 
incompatible businesses. Any purchase in excess of $2,500 must be accompanied by a 
Purchase Requisition document that has been approved by an appropriate supervisor.  
The engineering company typically has two types of misuse: accidental and audit 
exceptions. Accidental are honest mistakes that are caught, reported, and fixed before the 
billing cycle (personal cell phone calls mixed with business charges, for example). Audit 
exceptions are things like not getting approval for items over $2,500, not retaining a 
receipt, or charging something that belongs on the Travel & Entertainment Card. 
Assuming it is a minor infraction; an audit exception is treated as a learning experience 
on the first incident, but still documented. A person with more than two audit exceptions 
does not stay a cardholder for very long. 
6. Commercial Card Bank Interview 
For every commercial purchase card program in existence, there is a bank running 
it behind the scenes. Since there are a wide variance of controls between the government 
and industry, more information was needed to find out what kinds of controls are 
required by the banks, which are implemented by the client, and how the programs and 
rates of misuse vary between government and industry.  
Within the Department of Defense (DOD), there are two banks associated with 
the SmartPay2 contract (Interview with DPAP, 2014) to choose from when initiating a 
purchase card program. An executive at one of these banks was interviewed for this 
report. 
a. Internal Controls 
When setting up a purchase card program with the bank, whether a government or 
commercial client, a strong emphasis must be placed on the development of internal 
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controls. Although the client is taking on the “central liability” for the program, the bank 
wants to ensure that the credit card program is proactive at preventing unwanted behavior 
because the bank assumes a great deal of the risk associated with a purchase card 
program.  
The bank will work with each new client to build business processes and 
recommended controls to determine who can receive a purchase card, the span of control 
implemented, credit and usage limits, and the blocking or allowance of certain types of 
merchants to best fit the client needs. The bank will continually assess each client by 
conducting “due diligence” about the client’s business and ability to pay the purchase 
card bill. This due diligence includes understanding the internal control process, 
procurement and contracting policies, governing risk policies, and credit rating. Some 
items specific to government include legislation like the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) Circular 123 and the Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 
2012, which this interviewee cited as setting controls for the government program. 
b. Fraud and Abuse 
Fraud is something that happens when an external third party obtains access to 
purchase card information and makes purchases that were not authorized. Although this 
is a liability covered and investigated by the bank, client cardholders are expected to sign 
an affidavit stating they were not party to the fraud. The card companies will manage 
these affidavits in the future to ensure repeat offenses do not go unnoticed. 
Misuse happens when a cardholder intentionally or mistakenly purchases 
something the purchase card was not intended to purchase. This can be something that is 
not authorized by rules or regulations, something beyond the scope of the mission or 
need, or something intentionally purchased for personal gain.  
Both of these issues can be prevented with internal controls, but it is not possible 
to prevent everything. A strong review and audit system must also be in place to identify 
questionable transactions after the fact. Bank software programs, like the Program Audit 
Tool (PAT), help to find trends and flag transactions that warrant a closer look.  
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c. Rates of Misuse 
Because the banks are not liable for instances of purchase card misuse, they have 
no mechanism for collecting that data or tracking it. However, due to the strong policies 
developed by the government to safeguard the purchase card, federal misuse rates are 
typically lower than industry. 
d. Government vs. Industry 
All purchase card clients are treated basically the same; but depending on the 
contract and the size of the client, the services available and rebate amounts may differ.  
The purchase card rebate program is an incentive that works in two ways: it 
rewards purchase activity and rewards prompt payment. When a merchant accepts a 
customer purchase card, he agrees to pay a fee to the bank for the service of accepting 
purchase cards, usually 1.5–3.5% of the charged purchase. When a client, like the Navy, 
has a purchase card program, he is rewarded with a small percentage of the fee charged to 
the merchants. Additionally, the client is rewarded for paying the monthly bill early. For 
each day prior to the due date the bill is paid, he will get another small percentage back. 
There are many other benefits for an organization to implement a purchase card program:  
(1) Access to useful purchasing data (data mining) 
(2) Ability to implement automatic controls, without human intervention  
(3) Available auditing tools to find/flag transactions 
(4) Credit card company employs a fraud early warning team 
(5) Credit card company takes on financial risk of fraud 
Overall, a purchase card is a very valuable tool. Not only does the purchase card 
program enable a fast and efficient method of payment, it also provides protection against 
fraud and gives a refund. It can also provide an economical means of extracting purchase 
data to look at trends and develop purchasing statistics. 
B. OPINION INTERVIEWS 
Because this project is mostly focused on the various effects of the acquisition 
process on operational units, it was important to contact subject matter experts and 
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stakeholders in the contracting and purchase card arena, as well as those in the position to 
make or change the policies. 
The questions asked were: 
(1) Why hasn’t the Navy/DOD/government increased the purchase card limit? 
(2) Are there specific entities, rules, or restrictions preventing an increase? 
(3) What are some concerns if the purchase card limit was increased? 
(4) Are the internal controls currently in place sufficient? 
(5) How could we best utilize the saved FTE resources at FLC? 
a. Type Commander Interview 
The “primary day-to-day management responsibility for the program lies with the 
APC in the Navy major commands” (GAO, 2002). Since the type commander (TYCOM) 
is the first level of oversight for the purchase card program in the fleet, it is important to 
understand how an increase in the transaction limit might affect them. TYCOM also 
assists the units with training, assist visits, and conducts the inspections.  
(1) Did not discuss. 
(2) Did not discuss. 
(3) There are three major concerns that we look at with the purchase card 
program: fraud, abuse, and Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) 
compliance. Every single month, there is at least one fraudulent transaction in our card 
program. Although these cases are reported quickly and are not usually a liability for the 
ship, an increase in the purchase card limit would enable larger fraudulent charges to 
become the norm. We have approximately 400 purchase cards in the 150 units that we 
oversee. Nearly every month there is an incident of misuse. There is not a prevalence of 
sailors using the card for person gain; however, there are frequent transactions that need 
to be reversed due to a mistake or items that should have been purchased through other 
means. Finally, the FIAR is a looming change that expects budgetary transparency. 
However, in a recent inspection on one of our ships by the Naval Audit Service, 20% of 
the purchase card transactions did not have any documentation. If the purchase card limit 
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were to increase, there would be more purchases made by the ships and that undesirable 
behavior could increase. 
(4) Did not discuss. 
(5) Did not discuss. 
Afloat Training Group Interview 
The Afloat Training Group (ATG) is a subset of TYCOM. According to the 
website, an ATG “provides dynamic, quality afloat training to Navy and Coast Guard 
Sailors to ensure a combat ready force capable of performing a broad spectrum of 
maritime missions” (ATG, 2014). In addition to training, they also audit and inspect most 
programs on the ship.  
(6) It is time to increase the purchase card limit, up to $4,000 or $5,000. This 
amount is recommended because prices have increased, and most commands are required 
to have the CO sign purchases that are greater than $5,000. The benefits of increasing the 
purchase card transaction limit are (1) improve the buying power of the ship, (2) reduce 
the contracting backlog, (3) decrease or eliminate split purchases, and (4) efficiently 
improve the logistical readiness of the ships. 
(7) Not discussed. 
(8) There needs to be more controls in place than just the electronic systems, a 
continued effort to audit programs and APCs must be more proactive to provide better 
oversight and training.  
(9) There are very few, if any, misuse issues in the fleet; however, there are 
accountability issues. APCs need to be more involved in the oversight process and hold 
the AO and cardholder accountable with corrective and disciplinary actions.  
(10) Not discussed. 
b. Fleet Logistics Center Interview 
According to the website, Fleet Logistics Center (FLC) “provides logistics 
support services to the fleet, wing, and shore commands of the Navy and Air Force, the 
Coast Guard, the Military Sealift Command, and other joint and allied forces…to deliver 
supply chain management, contracting, transportation, defense fuel products and 
worldwide movement of personal property” (FLC, 2014).  
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FLC is one of the three main procurement outlets for operational units and the one 
who has the potential to feel the most change with an increase in the purchase card 
transaction limit. 
(1) An increase in the purchase card limit will further reduce the number of 
purchases that are going to small businesses. 
(2) Most of the limiting restrictions in place are policies to promote small 
business. Promoting small business is the backbone of the economy. If the limit is 
increased, there is a greater likelihood of circumventing competition and moving away 
from small business purchases. 
(3) If there was a procedure in place that required commands to find three 
quotes and justify purchases on their own, who would police that process? FLC already 
has issues because too many commands are not providing three quotes for a contract 
request. FLC had to establish a new process to research single-quote requests because 
commands were either too busy to do the research or not putting forth the effort. 
(4) There are a few internal controls that could be implemented which would 
lessen the risks associated with an increase in the purchase card limit. First, create a navy 
enlisted classification (NEC) specialization code for government purchase card (GPC) 
experts that would require an annual recertification and continuing training. Second, 
increase the curriculum at A-School for purchase card program topics. Third, increase the 
frequency of Procurement Performance Management Assessment Program (PPMAP) 
audits or ATG purchase card inspections. 
(5) Strategic sourcing vehicles are the next big emphasis in government. If 
requirements were combined, not just with the Navy or DOD, but the entire government, 
into a single contract that the government could order against, multiple government 
contracts to the same vendor for the same service could be avoided, better prices could be 
secured, and service variances could be reduced. These vehicles could have a requirement 
built in, as applicable, to include the use of small businesses at a certain level (hiring 
local subcontractors, for example). By consolidating requirements for purchases like 
office supplies, office furniture, and janitorial supplies, we could create economies of 
scale and leverage cost savings across a larger purchase.  
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c. CCPMD Operational Interview 
The Consolidated Card Program Management Division (CCMPD) is the primary 
resource for training and policy for the Navy purchase card program. It is important to 
understand what changes needed to be made for the internal controls. Also, the average 
purchase card transaction is below $1,000, so there does not appear to be a need to 
increase the limit. 
(1) Those making the policy decisions are not considering the effects on the 
operational side, but overarching views. Although increasing the limit will probably 
better facilitate the user, it might not take into account other political, statutory, or 
regulatory aspects of the program such as its effect on small business.  
(2) Unions have a big stake in the Davis Bacon Act, the law is to their benefit.  
(3) If the purchase card limit were to increase, small business would be 
affected. Turnover, especially in the military, is very high. The APCs have a steep 
learning curve and the initial training requirements may not be sufficient for the nuances 
of the program. An increased purchase limit would increase the likelihood of misuse and 
fraud. Finally, there is a big education and experience difference between a contracting 
officer and a cardholder. Increased purchase card limits may eventually require 
cardholders to increase their education level. 
(4) An increase to $4,000 or $5,000 would be doable, without affecting small 
business. An increase in the ceiling of the simplified acquisition threshold (SAT) would 
also help. If the increase goes beyond $5,000 there should be another layer of approvals 
incorporated into the purchasing process. Also, a large increase should not be across the 
board, but selective. Although not part of the current policy, AOs should review and 
approve requests before purchase. Incorporating the System of Award Management 
(SAM) could assist the cardholder with identifying small businesses. SAMs has 
consolidated the capabilities of multiple vendor lists and databases to identify 
irresponsible vendors and small businesses. Finally, CON 237 is not a useful course for a 
cardholder. If another course, more suitable to an Ordering Officer function, were 
established, it would be more effective and provide the appropriate level of education 
needed for those types of transactions. 
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(5) Adding FTE to assist a large, complicated contract before the award is 
made will not improve or speed up the award process. Most delays in the contracting 
process are not something that increased manpower can fix (legal advice, approvals…). 
However, if the FTE could be applied after the contract award, during the contract 
management period, the extra manpower may have more effect on savings and 
decreasing wastefulness during the contract period. 
d. CCPMD Policy and Oversight Interview 
The Consolidated Card Program Management Division (CCMPD) is the primary 
resource for training and policy for the Navy purchase card program. It is important to 
understand what changes needed to be made for the internal controls.  
(1) The risk of misuse without proper program oversight needs to be mitigated 
before increases will be considered. There are other laws that are also impacting the 
increase of the purchase card, like Davis-Bacon and Services Contract Act. 
(2) The Ronald Reagan Act does allow the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) counsel to increase acquisition programs for inflation every five years using the 
consumer price index (CPI). This is what brought about the increase to $3,000 in FY07.  
(3) The purchase limit can safely be increased to between $8,000 and  
$13,000 using current control mechanisms. There are also applications that cardholders 
can use now, with proper training. For example, another service is currently using 
cardholders to spend up to $25,000 against “pre-priced” contract vehicles, like blanket 
purchase agreements (BPA) and indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (ID/IQ) orders. 
The purchase card limit could safely be increased to $10,000 and still maintain the intent 
of competition and small business rules if commands were required to use a “best 
practices” form for purchases over a certain amount. Such a form could require three 
quotes and a justification about why a particular vendor was selected. It could be 
approved by a higher command and kept with the purchase documentation for audit 
purposes. 
(4) The controls currently in place are sufficient; however they will need to be 
adjusted to fit the parameters of the new limits. There could also be increased scrutiny of 
the higher level purchases. Finally, rather than an across the board increase, there could 
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be special, specific simplified acquisition procedures (SAP) training for only a selected 
portion of the cardholders to minimize risk. For example, designating only one person at 
each command could make purchases over $3,000. 
(5) Did not discuss. 
e. Naval Supply Systems Command Interview 
“The commander of Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) is designated 
as the Navy’s chief contracting officer and under his command is the Navy Purchase 
Card Program” (GAO, 2002). NAVSUP is the contracting arm of the Navy; and they 
ensure the Navy is following the rules regarding contracts  
(1) The Navy/DOD/government is risk adverse. A purchase card transaction 
increase will just increase the amount of purchases going to “big box stores” and reduce 
those going to small business. 
(2) Did not discuss. 
(3) It would be reasonable to increase the purchase card limit within the range 
of $8,000 to $13,000; however, any purchase above $10,000 should have to be completed 
by someone with 1402 contracting authority. Once a requirement exceeds $10,000 there 
is an increased potential for pricing discounts using competition. The focus for this size 
of contract should be on using the suites of existing contracts and following fair 
opportunity competition rules to maximize savings with larger requirements.  
(4) There should also be more training on how to use existing BPAs, ID/IQs 
and reverse auctions; and increase the use of DOD electronic mall (EMALL) and General 
Service Administration (GSA) Advantage.3 If cardholders were more knowledgeable 
about these vehicles, they could purchase a wide variety of common-use items without a 
special contract in place for their command. Increasing the use of these pre-populated 
vehicles would also decrease risk because it has established pre-negotiated prices and 
made specific items available. 
                                                 
3 One drawback to DOD EMALL and GSA Advantage is that their pricing structure is built on 
purchasing one item. There is no mechanism in place to receive a discount when purchasing multiple items. 
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(5) FLC resources could be better used by leveraging their skill and 
experience to make pre-populated contract vehicles for cardholders to use, ensuring the 
best price available. The NAVSUP representative stated that the Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy, Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN (RD&A)) said that we spend 
$93 billion on contracts, 80% of which are written to only 200 vendors. In some cases a 
single vendor may have 200 or more individual contracts from different government 
agencies at any given time. These redundant contracts are highly inefficient for both 
parties and the government is subjected to a wide range of rates and terms for the exact 
same product or service. 
Contracting facilities could leverage their training and experience to better assist 
individual units who only write a handful of contract requests a year. First, they could 
focus on writing better contracts that multiple entities could take advantage of with the 
purchase card. Second, they could assist customers who need to write a statement of work 
for a service contract; most commands do not fully understand what they require and 
therefore write very poor statements of work. Third, they could work with customers to 
find the core requirement; many times what a customer needs and what they believe will 
satisfy that need are two entirely different things. Finally, contracting facilities could 
leverage existing systems so they could better track successes and failures to measure the 
effectiveness of what they are contracting.  
f. Small Business Administration Interview 
According to the website, “the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) was 
created in 1953 as an independent agency of the federal government to aid, counsel, 
assist, and protect the interests of small business concerns, to preserve free competitive 
enterprise and to maintain and strengthen the overall economy of our nation” (SBA, 
2014). Because so many of the preceding interviews mentioned, and even emphasized, 
small business as a concern for purchase card limit increases, this study contacted the 
small business advocates directly. 
(1) 41 US Code 1908 – Inflation Adjustment of Acquisition Related Dollar 
Threshold allows the Federal Acquisition Regulatory (FAR) Council to increase limits 
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with inflation every five years. Another adjustment is due in 2015, and they are 
responsible for implementing the inflationary adjustment.  
(2) SBA is concerned about inflation adjustments because it directly affects 
procurements that are exclusively set-aside for small business. Purchases above the 
micropurchase threshold ($3,000) and below the simplified acquisition threshold (SAT) 
($150,000) are set aside for small business participation, in accordance with 15 USC 
644(g) (sec. 15(g) of the Small Business Act). This is especially relevant and troublesome 
when the micropurchase threshold is adjusted upward and the SAT remains unadjusted. 
(3) Purchases made using the purchase card do not have a mechanism in place 
to track if the source of supply was a small or large business. Purchase card data is not 
reported for individual transactions, but in aggregate. This makes it difficult for the SBA 
to determine if small businesses are being utilized to the maximum extent practicable in 
accordance with statute. 
(4) SBA would not be concerned about an increase, if there was legislation 
drafted requiring the use of small businesses below the micropurchase threshold, where 
small businesses were identified that could meet the requirements. In addition, buyers 
would be required to track and record the source of supply below the micropurchase 
threshold to assist senior managers in assessing the federal small business industrial base. 
There is a Naval Civilian Small Business Specialist at support activities like the 
Fleet Logistics Center in the Office of Small Business Programs, as well as a Small 
Business Administration Procurement Center Representative. They are there to support 
and assist with research.  
(5) Not discussed. 
g. Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Interview 
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)) in cooperation with Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 
has overall responsibility for DOD purchase card program” (GAO, 2002). According to 
the website, the Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) “is responsible for 
all Contracting and Procurement policy matters including e-Business in the DOD. DPAP 
executes that policy through the timely update of the Defense Federal Acquisition 
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Regulation Supplement (DFARS), Procedures, Guidance, and Information (PGI) and 
DOD Directive 5000.1&2” (DPAP, 2014).  
(1) There is no opposition for increases for inflation; however, larger 
increases are opposed because of a lack of internal controls and small business concerns. 
The newest DOD Guidebook contains stronger controls. 
(2) The Davis Bacon Act is not a main reason for not increasing the purchase 
card limit. 
(3) Purchases made to small businesses will decrease. Also, since many card 
programs are not aware of or not utilizing the controls in place in the Guidebook, it 
creates a greater need for oversight. The government performed over $5 billion on the 
purchase card in FY13, we need to ensure we are giving the best value to the taxpayer. 
(4) The Navy has a very effective purchase card oversight program (CCPMD) 
which is well staffed to provide support. The other services have only 2 individuals each 
to perform those same tasks.  
(5) The savings associated with moving purchases from contract facilities to 
purchase cards may not provide the anticipated savings. There are more and more 
controls and requirements being placed on the purchase card, such as Green Procurement 
initiatives and requirements to verify vendors against blocked lists (Excluded Parties List 
System).  
This chapter investigated the current impacts of the purchase card and contracting 
program on operational units, broke down the contract process, interviewed industry 
procurement officials about purchase card programs, and spoke with stakeholders of the 
purchase card program. 
Chapter IV will compare and analyze the data collected in Chapters II and III, 






IV. INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS 
In the previous chapters, this project presented the possibility of changing the 
purchase card program to better conform to current needs and constraints. The history of 
the purchase card was reviewed. Reports and articles related to the purchase card 
program and its history were presented. Readily available data from contracting and 
purchase card consolidated programs was presented. Interviews with purchase card users 
and subject matter experts provided information on common uses and practices regarding 
the purchase card. Finally, high-level stakeholders were interviewed to get an overall 
look at the policy concerns and ramifications that an increase to the purchase card limit 
could create, for both risk and reward.  
This chapter will take the data collected and rearrange it into a useful format that 
can be used to build a decision model. Comparisons will be made of similar data 
structures to see how they affect each other and how they fit within the entire system. 
A. DECISION 
The purchase card limit should be increased beyond a mere adjustment for 
inflation. Any amount within $8,000 to $13,000 will provide greater effectiveness, 
allowing an operational unit to efficiently purchase more of what they need, when they 
need it. The Fleet Logistics Center (FLC) would be able to take their focus and 
experience away from thousands of small, insignificant purchases and give more 
attention to large dollar and more complicated contracts, ones that provide multiple 
opportunities for waste and misuse of taxpayer money and require ample attention to 
detail.  
Based on the concerns and recommendations during the interviews, the following 
logic framework and analysis will be illustrated assuming an increase of the purchase 
card transaction limit to $10,000. The reasoning for this is (1) it is in the middle of the 
suggested effective range, (2) it is a nice, round number, (3) it was palatable to most 
stakeholders, with limitations, and (4) it will better illustrate the effects of the final 
recommendation.  
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1. Logic Framework 
The logic framework for this project was to determine if the controls in place 
were sufficient to mitigate the risks of increasing the purchase card limit. This framework 
provides a visual picture of the primary concerns of the acquisition process and the 
controls in place to mitigate those concerns. Figure 16 illustrates the contracting controls, 
while Figure 17 focuses on the purchase card controls.  
 
Figure 16.  Matrix of Risk Mitigation in Government Contracting 
To use Figures 16–18, the reader would consider if the CONTROL in place 
actively addresses the CONCERN. An example for the purchase card chart would be: 
Does initiating a Request Document actively Prevent Misuse. The answer is yes, so the 
box is green. The reason the answer is yes is because by initiating a purchase request, a 
need is put on paper. This will be routed to a supervisor, who agrees that a need exists. 
When the request is routed to the Supply Department, they will verify that the need is 
valid and allowable for purchase. At the end of the month, this request will be routed with 
the receipt to the Approving Official (AO) and Agency Program Coordinator (APC) for 
final verification. Then, the request will be saved for six years (and three months), to be 




Figure 17.  Matrix of Risk Mitigation in Government Purchase Cards 
 The remaining controls are described as follows: 
(1) Training. Prior to assuming a role in the program (cardholder, AO, APC, 
or Head of Activity), role training is required. This online training is accomplished 
through the Consolidated Card Program Management Division (CCPMD) website, and 
refresher training is required every two years. Ethics training, also available through 
CCPMD, is required annually. Defense Acquisition University (DAU) purchase card role 
training is a one-time requirement. Finally, after the APC completes the annual update to 
the local purchase card internal operating procedures (IOP), training for all AOs and 
cardholders is required. The IOP should be updated by re-reading the NAVSUP 
Instruction 4200.99B, considering the current state of the local program and making 
adjustments that could make the local procedures more restrictive than the instruction 
requires. Some operational programs require additional training to provide greater role 
awareness. For example, the AO must also complete the cardholder training and the APC 
must also complete the AO and cardholder training.  
There are other training courses available to enhance learning, including training 
to receive a 1402 contracting warrant; this enables the cardholder, with approval, to 
purchase up to $150,000 with the purchase card using pre-established contracting 
vehicles, like a BPA. 
(2) The current standard transaction limit for government purchase cards is a 
maximum of $3,000 for supplies, $2,500 for services, and $2,000 for construction 
projects and materials. As discussed, the limit can be increased with required special 
training or when using the purchase card as a method of payment (MOP) on a contract.  
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(3) The monthly limit for each cardholder should be reviewed annually and 
adjusted, as necessary, depending on how much purchasing power the cardholder 
requires. An average of monthly purchases over time will provide an estimate of the 
required monthly limit. At no time should an arbitrarily high limit be assigned, as this 
would provide an opportunity for misuse of the purchase card and subject the government 
to unnecessary risk. 
(4) The AO is the first line of defense in the purchase card program. The AOs 
span of control is limited to seven cardholders, to maintain appropriate oversight of the 
cardholder activity. This critical position will verify that the purchase is valid, funding is 
available, mandatory sources have been checked, and the request paperwork is sufficient 
to make the purchase. Neither the AO nor APC can be a cardholder in the program they 
manage. 
(5) Mandatory sources have been established by contracting facilities to take 
advantage of bulk buying opportunities and to assist cardholders with assigning 
purchases to small business through blanket purchase agreements (BPA) like Department 
of Defense (DOD) electronic mall (EMALL) and General Service Administration (GSA) 
Advantage. This decreases government risk by negotiating prices in advance and limiting 
the items available for purchase.  
(6) Merchant category codes (MCC) are used to categorize each merchant 
according to the type of business the merchant is engaged in and the kinds of goods and 
services provided (NAVSUP, 2012). A bank or APC can adjust settings in the purchase 
card program to restrict the cardholder from making purchases at specific types of 
establishments. Establishments that might be blocked are restaurants, entertainment 
venues, and toy stores, as these establishments typically do not conduct business with the 
military or government. 
(7) After the purchase and the item appears on the billing statement, the AO 
and APC verify the purchase documents to verify that the receipt matches the item stated 
on the purchase request, that all signatures and supporting documents are in place, and 
the item has been received and turned over to the requestor. 
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(8) The Program Audit Tool (PAT) is an electronic program designed to flag 
questionable transactions for extra review. It will flag transactions that exceed the 
purchase limit, appear to be split purchases, and include other random transactions. The 
purpose behind this is to have the AO and APC double-check these transactions for 
validity, add a contract number (if it is a MOP), and provide an explanation of any other 
questionable items. These explanations will be forwarded to the next level APC for 
further review. 
(9) Finally, the Afloat Training Group (ATG) is charged with inspecting the 
purchase card program every 18 months to verify that processes and controls are in place 
and effective, training is up to date, and the rules are followed. They will request a 
random sample of purchases and walk through each one to verify that the proper steps 
were followed.  
Because the risk of fraud and misuse are inherent in an operation where thousands 
of dollars trade hands on a daily basis, the controls in place and the people in those roles 
are a necessary steps to keep taxpayer dollars going to their intended purpose (Keeney, 
2007).  
Industry Practices 
Executives from industry were interviewed to get an overall picture of how 
purchase card programs in for-profit companies compare with the government system. 
The author of this project expected that industry purchase card programs would differ 
from the government, but the differences in controls were much wider than anticipated. 
Although they typically have smaller transaction limits, industry programs do not require 
documentation for a purchase. Instead of personnel oversight, they rely heavily on 
computer programs. Some programs have grey areas for very small infractions and most 
are quicker than the government to revoke purchasing ability.  
First, industry purchase card programs have fewer controls on purchase limits. 
Although most companies have general purchase card limits at approximately $1,000, an 
individual’s purchase card limit can be set higher, as needed for their mission, with no set 
upper limit. Most companies make frequent use of the ability to raise and lower purchase 
card limits within the bank program. 
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Second, industry purchase card programs do not require a written request for a 
purchase. A typical purchase has no documentation to indicate what was requested, by 
whom, and for what purpose. There is also no requirement to have approval from the 
requestor’s supervisor, nor from the purchasing supervisor. Each company has a few 
specific items that do require supervisors’ approval prior to purchase. These can be 
documented on paper or in a printed e-mail and must be included with receipt 
submission.  
Third, except for data mining and queries during the month, industry purchase 
card purchases are only reviewed after the statement is released from the bank. At the end 
of the period, all receipts are submitted with the statement to the more senior purchase 
card supervisor. Most companies do have a strict receipt policy, where every transaction 
must be matched with a receipt; however, many receipts are not specific enough to 
determine what was purchased. If there is ever a question about a purchase made in the 
past, these companies would be relying primarily on cardholder memory. Most 
companies will not retain the services of a cardholder who fails to provide receipts for 
more than a couple of purchases over more than a couple of months. 
Fourth, like the government program, the banks have software for building 
queries and monitoring the purchase card program. The senior purchase card officials 
rely heavily on these systems for monitoring unusual behavior and questionable 
purchases. Many cardholders in industry are assigned to divisions or programs outside 
the purchasing department and in some cases are physically located in other states across 
the country.  
Finally, industry purchase cardholders generally complete varying degrees of 
training and testing prior to receiving a purchase card. Most are given ethics training and 
most companies require refresher training, just like the government. So, when a 
cardholder makes a questionable purchase or misuses the purchase card, they usually 
only get one or two chances before they are removed from the purchase card program. 
Initial incidents are usually considered mistakes; and although they are treated as a 




Figure 18.  Matrix of Risk Mitigation in Industry 
Figure 18 shows a similar matrix to that of the government matrix in Figure 17. In 
order to keep the program economical for the company, industry purchase cards allow 
more freedom in purchasing and oversight. Although they have looser restrictions, they 
do minimize the overall risk by keeping transaction and monthly limits lower than the 
government and minimizing the number of purchase cards in use. This lack of 
accountability and oversight in purchasing requirements would not be acceptable for the 
government, due to rigid constraints to make sure that taxpayer dollars are not being 
wasted on unnecessary purchases.  
2. Analysis 
The recommendation to increase the purchase card transaction limit is based on 
the specific information collected in Chapters II and III and the analysis completed in the 
this section. 
Adjusted for inflation, the $2,500 micropurchase limit set in 1994 would only 
have the purchasing power of $1,562 today, according to the consumer price index (CPI) 
(CoinNews, 2014). Simply to maintain the intended purchasing power, the micropurchase 
limit should be increased to $4,000 (CoinNews, 2014); however, greater efficiencies 
would be realized if the limit was set between $8,000 and $13,000.  
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If the manpower footprint in the contracting facilities can be reduced or better 
utilized, the savings associated with increasing the purchase card have the potential to be 
huge. In this section, the project will intimately look at the costs of creating a contract. 
Number of Contracts Written 
In Chapter II, summarized data about FLC contracts was presented. This data 
showed that the Navy spent $4.95 billion against 22,000 contracts in FY13. The initial 
project analysis began with a supposition that there should be a new purchase card 
transaction limit and it should fall somewhere between the current micropurchase limit of 
$3,000 and $25,000, the threshold for the simplified acquisition procedures (SAP). 
Therefore, this analysis will focus on contract and purchase card transactions that fall 
between $3,000 and $25,000.  
Figure 19 shows that contracts below $25,000 make up only 3% of all spending 
for FLC contracts.  
  
Figure 19.  Percentage of Contract Spending Below $25,000 (after FLC, 2013) 
Figure 20 shows that contracts below $25,000 make up 75% of contract 
transactions. It appears that the Navy is spending considerable time and effort on 
contracts that may not warrant the attention and delay in the acquisition of supplies. 
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Figure 20.  Percentage of Contract Transactions Below $25,000 (after FLC, 2013) 
Figure 21 breaks down the number of contracts written in each of the last four 
years to show how many contracts are written at each dollar value. For example, in FY10, 
there were 1,500 contracts written for requirements between $6,000 and $7,000.  
 
Figure 21.  Number of Contracts Between $3,000 and $25,000 (after FLC, 2013) 
Figure 21 also illustrates that the number of contracts written decrease 
significantly as the total contract value increases.  
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Cost of Writing Contracts 
Manpower in government organizations is measured using full time equivalents 
(FTE). An FTE is a unit of measuring a person’s working time in a format that compares 
easily across functions. For example, you can have one employee who works 40 hours a 
week or four employees who each work 10 hours a week; either of these examples 
equates to one full-time position, or one FTE. An FTE is worth 2,080 hours of paid 
working time in a year (GAO, 2014b).  
For the purposes of this study, Figure 22 was used to calculate the actual available 
working time available for one FTE in a year. A standard 15% or 320 hours a year are 
consumed by national holidays (at least 10 per year) (OPM, 2014), vacation days, and 
sick days which equates to 1,760 working hours of usable time for a typical FTE.  
 
Figure 22.  FTE Calculation (after GAO, 2014b) 
In order to determine how many FTE could be saved in the FLC contract process, 
Figure 14 was used as a guide to build the calculation system in Figures 23–32. Note that 
Figure 14 is a real-life time depiction of work time that considers bathroom breaks, 
meetings, phone calls, and other tasks; whereas this FTE determination assumes that the 
only task in a particular day is this one task of the contract process. Figure 23 assumes the 
tasks in question are the only tasks an FTE completes that day, and he does them in a 
continuous process all day long. 
There are various tasks in the process of writing a contract and it begins with a 
review by the Comptroller to verify funding available and confirm the purpose, time and 
amount are not excessive or incompatible with current purchasing rules. 
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Figure 23.  Tasks Per FTE (after FLC, 2014) 
For example, Figure 23 shows that to complete the Tech task, a Procurement 
Technician enters Funding Document Manager (FDM) and prints one contract package. 
He adds a coversheet and checklist, staples it, and delivers it to the Technical Screener’s 
desk for further review. To actually accomplish this task for one contract takes 3 minutes. 
If a task takes 3 minutes to accomplish, he should be able to print and deliver 20 contracts 
in one hour. Since there are 1,760 task hours in an FTE year, the Procurement Technician 
can print and deliver 35,200 contracts a year.  
A more complicated, but relevant, example is the Buyer. In Figure 14, the Buyer 
timeline includes a lot of time spent waiting for answers, call-backs, the bidding process, 
and so on. However, when figuring the FTE used for this calculation, the down-time was 
compressed to remove all time spent waiting on someone else’s action. In Figure 23, if a 
Buyer had only one contract to work on and he worked it continuously until it was 
complete, he would require 2880 minutes (48 hours or 6 working days) to complete a 
contract. That means one Buyer FTE can complete 37 contracts in a year. In real time, a 
Buyer would normally have 3–5 contracts in various stages on his desk at any given time, 
working bits and pieces of each one each day.  
Determining how many tasks a person can complete in a year is not helpful to 
determine how much of an FTE one task consumes. To calculate how many FTEs are 
used for one task, or contract, refer to Figure 24. If there are 1,760 hours in one FTE, then 
there are 105,600 minutes available. Since most of the tasks take only minutes, one task 
uses up a very small piece of an FTE; however, as one moves to the larger tasks, like the 
Buyer, we can see that one contract/task takes almost 3% of his annual time available. 
This makes sense if you consider he is supposed to be able to complete 37 contracts/tasks 




Figure 24.  FTEs Used per Task/Contract (after FLC, 2014) 
The individual tasks in Figure 24 can be added up, indicating that one completed 
contract uses up 3% (.0292) of an FTE. In order to figure out the savings across a whole 
batch of contracts, refer to Figures 25-30. These figures will lay out the process of 
determining how many contracts are written at each price level, how many of these 
contracts will have to remain at FLC because they are risk-heavy transactions, and how to 
translate these into a number of FTE saved by using a purchase card at an increased level. 
 




Figure 25 shows how many contracts FLC completed at various price levels over 
the four years of the study. There is an additional column that provides the average over 
the four years. For example, if the purchase card limit were increased to $4,000, an 
average of 1,906 contracts would be candidates for purchase on the purchase card.  
Under normal circumstances, the average data would be a valid number to use for 
predicting future contracts; however, notice that the number of contracts has steadily 
decreased over the four years of the study. Since the total amount spent on contracts 
decreased as well (as did the purchase card numbers), this is being attributed to an overall 
decrease in budget across the Navy. Therefore, the FY13 numbers have been chosen as a 
better measure of expected future behavior. This will help determine how many candidate 
contracts there are for transitioning to purchase cards. A candidate contract is a 
requirement that is currently sent to FLC for procurement, but may not need to be if the 
purchase card limits are increased.  
Several of the figures presented in past chapters have shown that despite the 
introduction of the purchase card, there are still a considerable number of FLC contracts 
written for requirements below $3,000. There are certain times when purchases under the 
purchase card limit must still go to contracting. For example, when there is a service 
other than delivery and installation, the agreement requires “terms and conditions” which 
must be completed by contract. Also, due to the responsibility and risk associated, 
airplane parts and non-common use hazardous material (HAZMAT) must be contracted. 
Without a contract, there is no control or recourse if the wrong part is ordered, delivered, 
does not function as required, or causes a mishap.  
To determine what percentage of total purchases below $3,000 are contracted 
through FLC, this study compared the FY13 data for contracts and purchase card 
purchases in Figure 26. The chart on the left provides a summary of the quantity of 
transactions made using both purchasing methods. It shows that 97% of purchase card 
transactions and 30% of contracts fall below the $3,000 micropurchase threshold. The 
chart on the right shows that 69% of purchase card and 0% of contracting dollars were 
spent below the $3,000 threshold.  
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Figure 26.  Transaction Comparison (after FLC, 2013; CCPMD, 2014) 
Notice that when the total contracts and purchase card purchases are combined in 
Figure 26, contracts make up less than 1% of all contract and purchase card transactions 
below $3,000.  
When this study considered what percentage of contracts might have to  
remain with FLC despite an increase in the purchase card limit, it was logically 
concluded that 1% of the contracts at each level should remain a contract and 99% of the 
contracts could be diverted to the purchase card. Looking at Figure 27, 1% of contracts 
was unrealistically small. Figure 20 showed that the number of purchases drastically 
decreased as the dollar figure increased. Because there are fewer purchases overall, there 
will be a greater percentage of requirements that need a contract. After considering that 
and applying various percentage rates, it was determined that the most reasonable 
percentage of transactions that might require a contract would be 20%.  
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Figure 27.  Percentage to Remain Contracts (after FLC, 2013) 
Looking at Figure 28, notice that as the purchase card limit increases, a 
decreasing number of FY13 contracts become candidates to be shifted out of FLC. Each 
line in the chart shows only shows contracts between the high and low range, however 
the “Total Contracts Removed from FLC” column represents a cumulative total  
(20% already taken into account) that can be removed. For example, if the purchase limit 
were to increase to $10,000, a total of 4,704 contracts could be removed from FLC.  
 82
 
Figure 28.  Contracts to Remove from FLC (after FLC, 2013) 
Next, the “Total Contracts Removed from FLC” column of Figure 28 was used to 
determine the total FTE saved by diverting contract requests to the purchase card.  
 
Figure 29.  FTE Saved per Year/Batch of Contracts (after FLC, 2013) 
Figure 29 is used to translate the number of contracts removed from FLC and 
multiply it by the number of FTE used by one contract. This product will give the annual 
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FTE savings created by producing fewer contracts. For example, increasing the purchase 
card limit to $10,000 would remove 4,704 contracts from FLC. If each of these contracts 
used .0292 (2.9%) of an FTE, it would create a savings of 137.47 FTE each year.  
According to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), a GS-12 in 
Washington State earned $73,420 a year in 2013. Multiply that by the 137.47 FTE saved 
in Figure 29 and that equates to $10 million per year in available resources at FLC if the 
purchase card were increased to $10,000.  
Using Figures 28 and 29, the chart in Figure 30 was completed for all 22 levels of 
contracts written to get the cumulative FTE savings from increasing the purchase card 
limit from $3,000 up to $25,000. The Delta column is the difference (or increase) from 
one limit to the next. For example, 25.85 additional FTE are saved when the purchase 
card limit increases from $4,000 to $5,000. 
 
Figure 30.  FTE Saved at Increasing Values (after FLC, 2013) 
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By stacking the Total FTE Saved numbers and building a picture of the savings, 
Figure 31 shows the cumulative effect when requirements previously purchased under 
contract are shifted to the purchase card.  
 
Figure 31.  Cumulative FTE Savings (after FLC, 2014) 
Figure 32 shows the same information as Figure 31, but in a different way. Figure 
32 shows how each jump in purchase card limit creates additional saved resources at FLC 
using the Delta column of Figure 30. Similar to the way a learning curve works, as the 
transaction level increases, less benefit is realized. In this case, as the value of the 
purchase increases, there are fewer purchases made and less FTE savings created when 
the work is diverted elsewhere. 
So, where is the “sweet spot” where the Navy receives the most “bang for  
the buck”? Figure 32 shows that at the $13,000 level, the benefit of reduced FTE flat-
lines and begins a slow decline. Once the purchase card limit has increased beyond 




Figure 32.  Incremental FTE Savings (after FLC, 2014) 
Figure 33 shows cumulative incremental increases in contract spending and 
transactions from $3,000 to $25,000. For example, in FY13, contracts between  
$3,000 and $4,000 use 4% of contract spending and 13% of contract transactions. 
Following this down the line, there is a consistent trend over the last four years, despite a 
change in budget, which indicates that 50% of the contracts written between $3,000 and 
$25,000 are reached at $8,000; while 50% of the contract money spent between  
$3,000 and $25,000 is reached at $13,000. This provides the logical zone of effectiveness 
where FLC contracts can be reduced by 50% if the purchase card limit is increased to 





Figure 33.  Cumulative Resources Used (after FLC, 2013)  
1. The Questions 
 
The primary question was to determine if it is feasible to increase the purchase 
card transaction limit. Looking at the history of contracting, it was apparent that rules and 
regulations are being updated frequently to address both internal issues and to reflect the 
changing needs of society. In fact, the acquisition and purchase card rules have changed 
numerous times in the past 30 years, so more change is possible. However, there were 
more issues than simply changing the purchase card transaction limit that were involved 
with this analysis. 
1. The level of comfort stakeholders have about increasing the purchase card 
limit is based on comparing the expected risks with the perceived rewards. Many feel the 
risks to small business and the potential of opening the government to larger fraud 
possibilities are too great, and the savings gained by removing contract oversight are not 
worth the risk. Others believe that the controls in place will sustain an increase, but more 
training could ensure that the controls are used more effectively. 
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2. This project provided an overview of historical legislation, regulations, 
and policies surrounding the procurement process for the government. Additionally, 
stakeholders in the programs provided amplifications of the reasons and concerns for the 
programs. 
3. Four companies were interviewed to determine the common threads of 
industry purchase card use and regulation.  
4. Chapter V will present the main topics of the research, give a 
recommendation and several subsequent actions to be implemented, as well as suggested 
topics for further research.  
Previous chapters discussed the issue of increasing the purchase card transaction 
limit, provided data to understand the issue, introduced information from subject matter 
experts (SME), and provided opinions and concerns from the policy and leadership 
perspective.  
This chapter provided a detailed analysis of the costs and time associated with 
subjecting low dollar, low risk requirements to the same, or similar, processes of high 
dollar, complex requirements.  
Chapter V will summarize the project and provide recommendations for 











The government purchase card (GPC) transaction limit needs to be increased to 
between $8,000 and $13,000 in order to keep up with inflation and to allow contracting 
resources to focus their attention on larger, more important contracts. This project 
examined the regulations, risks, and concerns regarding an increase in the transaction 
limit of the purchase card. 
This research is important because according to the 2012 Defense Strategic 
Guidance, we “must continue to reduce the cost of doing business” (Secretary of 
Defense, 2012) to keep ahead of fiscal constraints. Also, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense 
Review more specifically mentioned “continuing to implement acquisition reform 
efforts” (Secretary of Defense, 2014) where the government seeks to find efficiencies and 
support Better Buying Power across the force. Therefore, any increase in the purchase 
card limit beyond the intended purchasing power would result in greater mission 
readiness for operational units and a cost savings across the acquisition process. 
Significant full time equivalents (FTE) and financial savings could result from reducing 
the workload dedicated to small contracts. This would free up valuable time and 
resources at the Fleet Logistics Center (FLC) that could then be devoted to better 
managing larger contracts after award and creating solutions for cardholders that would 
benefit the government as a whole. The potential for savings in this manner is far greater 
than a mere reduction in personnel costs.  
A. THE BEGINNING 
The initial rationale for studying this topic began with a real-life need for 
increasing the purchase card limit based on one specific incident. There are many stories 
like it, but this story is mine. A couple of years ago, our ship was making last-minute 
preparations to go on deployment. It was Thursday morning and we were scheduled to 
deploy on Monday. Suddenly, during testing, a huge valve to a critical piece of 
equipment broke. The division scrambled to fix it, but it was beyond repair. A 
replacement valve was located at a nearby business and it was immediately available to 
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install, except that it cost nearly $10,000, which greatly exceeded our purchase card limit. 
We had the funds available, but we were not able to buy it.  
The division began preparing the necessary purchase paperwork, while the Supply 
Department called FLC to let them know a critical request was in process. Each piece of 
information was forwarded to FLC as soon as it was received so they could start working 
on it immediately. In the end, FLC pulled out every stop to write the contract and we had 
the valve delivered and ready to crane onboard late Friday afternoon. The division 
worked day and night over the weekend, and the ship was ready to get underway on 
Monday morning. 
This might sound like a warm and fuzzy good news story, but it is not. A lot of 
time and effort was wasted as four separate entities scrambled through a paperwork 
nightmare in order to secure a part that was sitting on the shelf, ready and waiting for 
payment. The entire division lost two days waiting to install the repair part, not to 
mention the time required to prepare the contract request document, Sole Source 
justification, and Urgency Impact statement. The Supply Department had to put other 
priorities aside and provide constant updates to FLC, while helping the division write 
(and re-write) the justifications in a manner that would be acceptable to FLC to support 
an immediate acquisition. The vendor had to provide more information and work through 
the contracting process, instead of just swiping a credit card. Finally, multiple people at 
FLC had to drop all other tasks and focus on one new urgent requirement. 
If this was an isolated incident, it could be overlooked. However, the Supply 
Officer interviews from Chapter III suggest that 15% of the contracts submitted to FLC 
by ships are Sole Source, Urgent contracts.  
B. THE FINDINGS 
This project conducted extensive research and comparison of purchase card and 
contract transactions as well as government and industry practices. Discussions with 
subject matter experts and high-level stakeholders were conducted. This research 
discovered the following issues:  
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(1) Seventy Five percent of contracts written at FLC are below  
$25,000. These contracts represent only 3% of the FLC contract dollar spending. 
Although there are legitimate reasons for creating a contract, the bulk of these purchases 
are commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) items, immediately available for sale and do not 
require special knowledge to safely acquire them. 
(2) Ships do not send very many contracts to FLC. Although suspected from 
the beginning, it was confirmed when ship Supply Officers provided a list of three to six 
contracts that covered several years. Since this was prevalent among multiple platforms 
and coasts, it can be assumed that most ship parts and supplies are generally available in 
the stock system or are of low enough dollar value to procure using a purchase card.  
(3) There are considerable contracting vehicles available that could increase 
the effectiveness of unit cardholders and better utilize the experience of contracting 
personnel. If cost savings from contract reduction measures could allow FLC to allocate 
resources to establish contracts that multiple units can order against, while ensuring the 
maximum use of small businesses, it would benefit all parties. 
C. RECOMMENDATION 
The procurement rules should be changed to reflect $10,000 as the micropurchase 
threshold. This would allow more autonomy for operational units to procure what they 
need, when they need it, for most items; but still provide professional and experienced 
oversight on larger contracts for competition. In addition to this $10,000 increase, there 
are several recommended controls to implement.  
(1) A navy enlisted code (NEC) should be established for the Approving 
Official (AO) position. This position is critical to the success and oversight of a purchase 
card program. Retaining the knowledge gained and rewarding the efforts of the more 
proficient AOs would be a significant step in preventing card misuse at future command 
and future programs.  
(2) Nearly every command in the Navy has a purchase card program; 
therefore a module within the Logistics Specialist A-School should focus on the rules, 
restrictions, and specific introductory training about using a purchase card. This segment 
could include topics like ethics, responsibility, documentation, mandatory sources, 
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strategic sourcing vehicles, and current best practices. This course is especially crucial for 
those sailors who do not have experience with a personal credit card or checking account. 
For sailors heading into the financial management division of a ship, this would serve as 
both a necessary introduction to government purchasing, as well as provide solid 
guidelines they could follow in their personal finance actions. 
(3) Establish an active local training program for Agency Program 
Coordinators (APC). Charged with providing oversight and guidance, the initial APC 
training is not sufficient to cover all the duties and responsibilities involved with ensuring 
compliance in a program that can have as many as 100 purchases in a month. This 
training should include a mechanism to share and incorporate the “best practices” of 
APCs in the region and beyond. An effective program can be as simple as a monthly 
meeting with upper echelon APCs at the TYCOM or ATG building to discuss current 
concerns and issues. 
(4) The $10,000 limit should not be an across-the-board increase; it should be 
an option available. Units could either (1) designate one cardholder to maintain a 
transaction level to satisfy requirements, or (2) the APC could adjust transaction limits 
for specific purchases and readjust to a lower amount afterward. Either of these options 
would reduce the risk to the government, but still provide the flexibility when situations 
dictate. The practice of managing transaction and monthly limits should be reviewed at 
least annually and changed as mission requirements dictate.  
(5) Specific annual ethics training for the purchase card program and similar 
financial positions should be developed to cover ethical and moral issues that are typical 
and relevant to the position. The current ethics training is insufficient for financial 
positions and is much too focused on senior leadership issues to be effective for junior 
personnel. 
Because small business was mentioned consistently as one of the primary reasons 
for not increasing the purchase limit, there are some further recommendations that can 
mitigate the concerns, but will create additional restrictions for cardholders.  
First, there are two main options available for cardholders that provide access to 
small business: Department of Defense (DOD) electronic mall (EMALL) and General 
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Service Administration (GSA) Advantage. Both of these resources are relatively easy to 
access and procure, however, they are set up for purchasing one of each item and do not 
provide discounts for buying in bulk. The FLC could use its resources and experience to 
build more BPAs that cardholders can purchase against and support small businesses. 
This may create more mandatory sources, and therefore create speed bumps in the buying 
process; however, in time, the cardholder would learn. In order to make cardholders 
aware of new options, the FLC would need to disseminate the information to cardholders 
so they can take advantage of new purchasing vehicles. FLC resources could also provide 
a mechanism to better promulgate information about local small businesses that could 
provide ship-ready items.  
Second, transactions between $3,000 and $150,000 are currently required to be set 
aside for small business (Rodden, 2010). If the purchase card limit increased to $10,000, 
there are two additional measures that could be taken to increase competition and support 
small business: (1) increase the simplified acquisition threshold (SAT) to $200,000 (for 
example) so more contract transactions fall to small business or (2) implement a process 
in the purchase card program where COTS purchases between $5,000 and $10,000 could 
be purchased by the unit after completing a competition sheet. A competition sheet would 
require the end user (with Supply Department facilitating, as necessary) to locate three 
vendors who are capable of providing the requirement. Then, a quick competitive 
analysis could be performed by the Supply Department and applicable Department Head. 
The final selection would be justified with a few sentences for auditing and continuity 
purposes, and provide an official means to document a unit Sole Source selection. The 
final selection would then be approved by the unit APC or Commanding Officer, the 
upper echelon APC, or a designated FLC representative, as deemed appropriate. This 
process, while taking an extra day or two, could ensure due diligence was performed to 
get a better price and make an effort to rotate vendors.  
D. FURTHER RESEARCH POSSIBILITIES 
There are many rules and restrictions within the procurement process; it is 
impossible change one law without affecting others. There are more Navy commands and 
government agencies that are each affected by acquisition changes in different ways. 
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Technology is rapidly changing the ability to collect and use data for decision-making. 
This research was outside the scope of this project and there are some recommended 
areas that could be further addressed to ensure a complete examination:  
(1) Seek more end-user data. Since this was a study based on the experiences 
of an operational Navy Supply Officer, there is a large population of FLC customers that 
are not represented by this data. Further research addressing the use, extent, and 
importance of purchase card and contracting from shore-based operational and non-
operational commands may provide a better picture of small acquisitions in the Navy.  
(2) Research other government agency purchase card programs. Research for 
this project uncovered many recent GAO reports and articles about other government 
entities that are not running a solid, effective purchase card program. The policy–makers 
for procurement may want to consider selectively increasing purchase card limits to only 
those agencies which have proven effective controls and have earned the right to take on 
larger responsibilities.  
(3) Update purchase card software to track small business use. Currently, 
there is no mechanism (other than a visual inspection) to discern the frequency or amount 
of purchase cards transactions that are associated with small businesses. If a program 
could be developed in conjunction with the NIACS codes to sort out purchases made 
using small businesses, it could improve the data available and justify more or less 
restrictions on the purchase card purchases over a certain amount.  
(4) Reexamine the Davis Bacon Act of 1931. It is confounding to this author 
that an 80-year old law, implemented before minimum wage laws were enacted in order 
to prevent government agencies from taking advantage of desperate laborers, is still 
dictating public construction purchases above $2,000. Using the consumer price index 
(CPI), when this law was established in 1931, $2,000 had a purchasing power of more 
than $30,000 today. A $2,000 contract in 2014 would have same purchasing power as 







It Is Time for an Increase 
United States Government procurement is an expensive and over-regulated 
process that has gone through multiple iterations in the more than 200 years since the 
country was founded.  
In government contracting, history presents itself as a series of cycles: the 
country faces a big emergency such as a war, or a major task such as 
landing a man on the moon; industry steps up to the task; as initial public 
enthusiasm wanes and the task settles in to performance, complaints about 
quality and cost ensue; fraud is unearthed and scandal follows, resulting in 
increased regulation; competition is reduced as companies leave the 
business; regulations are streamlined to bring competition back. Certain 
debates recur in each generation as well, and each generation tries to find 
their own balance: make or buy, protectionism or free trade, strict 
regulation or ease of administration, appropriate ethical standard, and fair 
price (Keeney, 2007, p. 18). 
As the government is winding down from war and cycling through the next wave 
of accusations about the wastefulness in acquisition, we should use this opportunity to 
break the cycle and set new, economical business practices in motion that will better 
prepare the U.S. for a successful ramp up in a future engagement. Remove unnecessary 
contracts from FLC oversight and allow operational units to vet an increased number of 
purchases that they can safely handle. Set up FLC facilities to better manage large and 
complicated contracts by employing teams to meet the needs of the government and 
ensure that contracts are managed so they are less susceptible to mission creep and have 
the manpower to provide oversight and foresight to detect problems before they become 
an issue. If FLC had the resources to make strategic pre-negotiated vehicles available for 
operational cardholders it could make purchasing simpler for the cardholder, safer for the 
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